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What makes a city "international" in character? Perhaps the first thing that
comes to mind is the degree of contact the city has with other countries, whether in the
form of business and trade contacts or in the form of cultural contacts. A second feature
of "internationalism" might be the population of the city. A diverse population leads to
a variety of other factors that can bestow an international feel, such as religious diversity
and even different types of cuisine. Yet another distinctive indicator of internationalism
may be the architecture of the city. Many cities have wonderful combinations of both
western-style buildings (ranging from Classical Roman to Gothic to Renaissance to
Baroque) and eastern-style buildings (whether Chinese, Japanese or Arabic) as well as
neighborhoods and areas which have their own style and feel. At the same time, the word
"international" must be used with a degree of caution, as it denotes the fairly modern
concept of distinct nations and states. "Multicultural" or "polyethnic" might be equally
applicable descriptions. In any case, when a place is described as international or
multicultural or polyethnic, it is associated with a certain sense of dynamism, excitement
and change.
The city of Hoi An during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was
"international" in all of the above respects. Located in central Vietnam on the north bank
of the Thu Bon River, approximately five kilometers upriver from where the Thu Bon
empties into the South China Sea, Hoi An, from at least the turn of the seventeenth
century until the 1770s, was a thriving international port. Arising from the confluence
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of (i) a newly established kingdom which needed a means to maintain its independence
and (ii) a boom in international commerce in Asia which was able to supply that means',
Hoi An during this period became one of Southeast Asia's classic trading entrepots. In
addition to the Vietnamese who had settled from the north as part of the "southern
expansion" (nam tien) and the already present Cham and other local peoples, Hoi An's
population included, at various times, numbers of Japanese, Chinese, Portuguese, and
Dutch, not to mention traders from other parts of Southeast Asia who came temporarily
for the trading season and assorted western missionaries. It was, however, the Japanese
(during the first half ofthe 1600s) and especially the Chinese who had the biggest impact
on the city. Likewise, it was primarily trade with Japan and China (which involved not
only the Japanese and Chinese but also the Portuguese and Dutch and others) which
fueled Hoi An's rise to prominence during this period.
While Hoi An during this time was very much an international city, many
themes of Vietnamese history are reflected in its story. As we shall see, for example,
intertwined in and central to Hoi An's development was the establishment of a polity in
central Vietnam independent from the traditional northern heartland. Similarly, Hoi An
was inextricably linked to the "southern expansion" of the Vietnamese people down the
long coastline. This expansion down the coast, the absorption of new peoples and ideas
and a certain degree of openness to foreigners, resulted in substantial differences between
1 See Li Tana's pioneering work on Nguyen Cochinchina, Nguyen
Cochinchina: Southern Vietnam in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries (Ithaca, New York, Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publica-
tions, 1998).
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northern and southern Vietnam, differences which are discernible today to even the most
casual tourist. Yet another element of the Hoi An story - the dominance of the Chinese -
foreshadows the critical role the Chinese would play in the economic development of
central and especially southern Vietnam in the 19* and 20' centuries, a role tinged by
racial divisions which continue to modern times. Thus Hoi An, in addition to its
internationalism, also provides another perspective from which we can view Vietnamese
history.
In examining the nature of Hoi An's "international" character during this
period of approximately 175 years, this paper first describes in Part II the local situation
in Vietnam - the southern expansion into the traditionally "frontier" area and how Hoi An
fit into the new kingdom's needs. Part III then reviews the international economic scene
during the period and the factors which influenced the direction of commerce. Both
these factors - the southern expansion and the international economic scene - were largely
responsible for Hoi An's development into an international city. Part IV then attempts
to recreate a typical day in Hoi An during its golden age from 1600 to 1770. In Part V we
take a closer look at that golden age, and in Part VI we look at Hoi An in its Vietnamese
context - that is, how did Hoi An fit into Vietnam? The paper concludes in Part VII with
a look at Hoi An today.
Before we begin our exploration of Hoi An, a brief discussion of sources
is in order. The scattered sources in a wide variety of languages pertaining to Hoi An
exemplify the challenges facing historians ofpre-modern Southeast Asia. No study of Hoi
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An during this period which refers to English language sources alone can be complete, and
given the author's linguistic limitations numerous sources remain inaccessible to me. 2 I
have, however, tried to incorporate non-English materials when I was sufficiently
comfortable with the reliability of the translation.
2 For example, there are many sources in Japanese (both primary source
materials and modern studies) which chronicle the Japan-Cochinchina
relationship such as Iwao Seiicho's Nanyo Nihon-machi no Kenku (Tokyo,
1944) and Study in a Japanese Town in the South (translation)(1977), and
Ogura Sadao's Japanese in the Days of Shuin-Sen (translation)(1989).
There are also numerous sources in classical Chinese, most notably the
Chinese monk Da Shan's account (1695) and Le Quy Don's Phu Bien Tap
Luc (Trontier Chronicles', 1776). W.J.M. Buch has written extensively in
Dutch on the Dutch presence in Vietnam during this time (Nederlander
met Annam in de XVIIe Eeun (1925) and De Oost-Indische Compagnie en
Qinam (1929), and there are apparently some 7000 pages of material on
Vietnam (2000 pages on Cochinchina alone) in the Dutch archives con-
cerning this period (see "Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC):
Material on Relations between the Dutch East Indies Company and the
Nguyen Lords in the 17' and 18t Centuries," by Truong Van Binh and
John Klienen in Ancient Town of Hoi An (International Symposium March
1990)(Hanoi, Gioi Publishers, 1993)). Pierre-Yves Manguin has written
extensively in French on the Portuguese presence in Vietnam - see Les
Portugais Sur les Cotes du Vietnam et du Campa (1972) and Les Nguyen,
Macao et le Portugal: Aspects Politiques et Commerciaux d'une Relation
Priviligee en Mer de Chine 1773-1802 (1984). Other relevant works in
French include Nguyen Thanh Nha's Tableau Economique du Vietnam aux
XVIIet XVIIIsiecles (1970) and Charles B. Maybon's Histoire Moderne
du Pays D'Annam (1592-1820) (1920, reprinted 1972). I have also had to
rely on English language studies of Chinese trading activities, but I have
not found a single comprehensive account of Chinese trade and shipping in
Southeast Asia, let alone Hoi An, suggesting that historical records of
private Chinese trading activities is limited. The aforementioned sources
are in addition to the Vietnamese sources, both dynastic chronicles as well
as modern historical accounts, which are too numerous to mention.
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PART II. VIETNAM: THE LOCAL SCENE AND SOUTHERN EXPANSION.
A. Vietnam: Overview 1550-1770s.
The late 1500s and early 1600s witnessed the birth of a new state in what
is now central and southern Vietnam. Known to foreigners as Cochinchina, the new state
would last until the 1770s when it was rendered asunder by a combination of the Tayson
rebellion and aggression by the Trinh in the north. Prior to the 1600s, the Red River delta
region in north Vietnam was the traditional heartland of Vietnamese civilization and
culture and the place where most of the Vietnamese people resided. In the 1520s, the
reigning Le Dynasty was effectively usurped by the Mac family, which ruled in the capital
area - Thang Long (today's Hanoi area) - until 1592. Resistance to Mac rule, led by the
related Trinh and Nguyen families, quickly broke out. Conflict among the rebels also
broke out, however, and a rebel leader from the Nguyen family, Nguyen Hoang, perhaps
sensing imminent conflict with the Trinh family, requested (via his sister, who was married
to the leader of the Trinh family), and in 1558 was appointed, garrison commander of
the province of Thuan Hoa. Thuan Hoa, which at the time encompassed today's city of
Hue, was far to the south of the rebel base in Thanh Hoa (which itself was just south of
Hanoi) and was generally recognized as a strategic buffer area in the south as well as an
area of potential subversion. 3
3 See Keith Taylor's "Nguyen Hoang and the Beginning of Vietnam's
Southward Expansion," in Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era:
Trade, Power and Belief, Anthony Reid, ed. (Ithaca, New York, Cornell
University Press, 1993), especially pp. 43-7. See also Nola Cooke, "Re-
(continued...)
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In 1572, Nguyen Hoang, still interested in ruling the north but also
desirous of expanding his power base in the south, was placed in charge of Quangnam,
the large province south of Thuan Hoa, whose nominal authority included Hoi An. While
in the south, Nguyen Hoang continued to fight the Mac usurpers, and when the Mac were
finally driven from Thang Long in 1592, Nguyen Hoang returned again to the north in
1593 to contest for the throne as well as engage in mop-up operations against the
remaining Mac forces. Although he stayed in the north for seven years, he failed to
supplant the Trinh and returned to the south in 1600, never again to venture to the north.
Despite various entreaties from the Trinh rulers, who were now in command of north
Vietnam and seemed to regard Nguyen Hoang and his forces as rebels, Nguyen Hoang
preferred to retain his independence in the south and began consolidating his rule. Thus,
one may view 1600 as the year of de facto separation between the north and the south,
when Nguyen Hoang made his final decision to live independently in the south. As one
commentator has suggested, Nguyen Hoang provided a model for a new way of being
Vietnamese, a model in which "talent and ability began to count for more than birth and
position....an escape from ancestors, an escape from the past." 4
3 (...continued)
gionalism and the Nature of Nguyen Rule in Seventeenth Century Dang
Trong (Cochinchina)," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Volume 29,
No. 1 (1998), pp. 122-161 (especially text from footnotes 80 to 88).
a Taylor, "Nguyen Hoang and Vietnam's Southward Expansion," pp. 48-61,
quoted text from p.64. Taylor's view of Nguyen Hoang as starting fresh in
the south without reference to the past and outside the confines of tradi-
tional Vietnamese culture in the north contrast sharply with the views of
Nola Cooke, who argues that the ultimate goal of the early Nguyen rulers
was to rule the north and a single, united Vietnam, not simply the south.
She believes that it was not until well in the 1700s that the Nguyen rulers
were able to overcome their emotional attachment to the north and reori-
(continued...)
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An uneasy truce existed between the Trinh in the north and the Nguyen in
the south until the late 1620s. The Trinh were likely too exhausted to fight the Nguyen
during this time, and as long as the Nguyen continued to pay taxes to the north and
remained peaceful, the Trinh may have been happy to maintain the status quo. In
addition, the presence of Nguyen Hoang - with his military skills, sterling reputation, and
close relations with the Trinh rulers - likely kept the Trinh at bay. Nguyen Hoang died
in 1613, however, and in 1620 his son and successor stopped paying tax to the Trinh, an
event which led directly to a series of seven Trinh campaigns against the Nguyen from
1627 to 1672.5 With the help of Portugese weaponry, the Nguyen were able to withstand
these invasions, and from 1672 until the 1770s there was a century of peace between the
north and south.
Despite the long peace between the Trinh and the Nguyen, beginning in
the middle 1700s numerous rebellions sprang up in the south. The Nguyen were able to
suppress most of these uprisings, but apparently did not address the root causes behind
them. In 1771 the Tayson rebellion broke out in the central highlands. The causes
behind the rebellion were no doubt complex and multiple, and even today there are few
4 (...continued)
ent themselves completely to the south. See Cooke's "Regionalism and the
Nature of Nguyen Rule," text from footnotes 182 through 205. Li Tana in
her work Nguyen Cochinchina does not comment specifically on this issue
of the Nguyen rulers' outlook, but clearly suggests that there was a definite
break in the beginning of the 17& century between the north and south
from a variety of perspectives, which would seem to align her much closer
to Taylor's view than Cooke's view.
s See Nguyen Cochinchina p. 11, and Thomas Hodgkin's Vietnam: The
Revolutionary Path to War (London, England, The MacMillan Press, Ltd.,
1981) p. 74. See Hodgkin pp.74-5 for more on the period of civil war.
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coherent explanations for the rebellion.' The Nguyen, fighting the rebels, were unable to
hold off the the advancing Trinh, who had taken advantage of the chaos and had seized
Hue - the Nguyen capital - in 1774. However, the rebellion would soon spread north and
bring down the Trinh as well. The Tayson rebellion and rule would constitute a 30 year
interlude between Vietnamese "dynasties" and result in yet another Chinese invasion in
1778 (the fifth since Vietnamese gained independence from the Chinese in the first half
of the 10' century) which was quickly beaten back.' From the ashes of the rebellion
emerged Vietnam's last dynasty in 1802, founded by Gia Long, the grandson of the last
Nguyen leader.
The beginning of the 17 century thus marked a significant shift in
Vietnam's history. Prior to this time, present-day central and south Vietnam were not
part of the settled, traditional northern heartland based in the Red River area and had
been, at least in the eyes of most Vietnamese, the home of the Chams as well as hide-outs
6 Li Tana in Nguyen Cochinchina offers a few explanations, most relating to
the continued expansion of the Vietnamese south and west in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. More specifically, she argues that there
were fundamental changes in the economy which the Nguyen rulers failed
to address: a decline in overseas trade which was the primary revenue
source for the government, and high inflation caused by a government
minting program attempting to compensate for a dwindling supply of
foreign coins (see Section B below). She also points to the 1765 palace
coup, the extravagant royal building program, the unstable Mekong delta
area and the regime's reliance on rice imports from that area, increased tax
demands and Vietnamese southern expansion and "localization". Thus the
rebellion sprang from one of the areas most affected by the policies, the
central highlands. See pp. 16-17 and Chapter Seven. See also Hodgkin,
Vietnam: The Revolutionary Path, Chapter Five, for more on the Tayson
rebellion.
Hodgkin, Vietnam: The Revolutionary Path, pp. 87-8.
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for criminals and "Vietnamese political refugees and malcontents." 8 Fromthe view ofthe
Vietnamese in the north, this unpacified region to the south was essentially a "frontier"
area. From the late 16'/early 17' centuries onward, however, the southern regions would
play a major role in Vietnamese history as the "southern expansion" or nam tien continued
at a brisk pace and the south continued to "develop" under Vietnamese control. Limited
by the geographical barriers of the sea to the east and the mountains to the west (which
often came very close to the sea, allowing for only a narrow corridor in between), nam
tien would continue throughout the 17 and 18" centuries (and into the 19' century) as
the Vietnamese displaced the Chams in central Vietnam and then the Khmers in the
Mekong Delta area. It was during this roughly 200 year period that Vietnam acquired
over one-half of its current territory (mostly in the south). The north would no longer be
the center of Vietnamese culture and civilization, as evidenced by Gia Long's decision in
1802 to make Hue the capital of a united Vietnam, a Vietnam which stretched from the
Chinese border in the north all the way to the Mekong Delta area in the south and which
for the first time in its long history resembled the shape it bears today.
B. Nguyen Cochinchina.
Turning back to that vital juncture in 1600, it is evident that Nguyen
Hoang faced numerous critical decisions in establishing his rule in central Vietnam.
Nguyen Hoang needed to find a means to ensure his fledgling kingdom's independence
against the threat of aggression from the much stronger Trinh in the north. How would
8 Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, p. 22.
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the new kingdom support itself and its followers? How would it attract followers, a
perennial issue in people-starved (but land-abundant) pre-modern Southeast Asia and
certainly an issue for the Nguyen in Cochinchina in the early 1600s. The answers were
found in promoting trade and commerce, encouraging mass immigration (both domestic
and Chinese), and integration with local peoples.9
Overseas trade and commerce was a key factor in the development of the
Nguyen state. Li Tana notes that "without trade and commerce, it is doubtful whether
Dang Trong [the Nguyen kingdom] could even have survived.... [o]verseas trade was the
engine driving Dang Trong's spectacular development." Foreign trade supported Nguyen
Cochinchina in a number of ways: first, by providing revenue (from customs and duties)
to state coffers, second, by stimulating local economic development (see Part VI below),
and third, by providing access to European weaponry (primarily Portuguese, and some
Dutch) used to keep the Trinh at bay.1" Even before 1600, Nguyen Hoang realized how
essential foreign trade was; the Vietnamese annals noted how during the 1570s and 1580s
"seaborne merchants from foreign kingdoms all came to buy and sell, a trading center was
established...." and "the boats of merchants from all kingdoms gathered...consequently,
a large city was established." The city referred to is undoubtedly Hoi An." With his
decision in 1600 to withdraw entirely from the north, Nguyen Hoang made concerted
By far the best work on Nguyen Cochinchina is Li Tana's Nguyen
Cochinchina cited previously. Much of the following discussion is drawn
from her work.
10 Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinachina, p. 98, quote from p.58.
Taylor, "Nguyen Hoang and Vietnam's Southward Expansion," pp. 49-50.
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efforts to attract foreign trade'2 , and Hoi An was designated as the regime's primary port
for overseas trade.
Clearly cognizant ofthe importance of the Japanese trade, Nguyen Hoang
in 1601 sent a letter to Tokugawa Ieyasu of Japan seeking to develop trade and good
relations. Ieyasu responded positivelyto the letter and informedNguyenHoang ofJapan's
recently established red seal trade. Correspondence with Japan was regular through the
1620s (during reign of Nguyen Hoang and his son) but naturally decreased with Japan's
decision in the 1630s to withdraw from foreign contact. One scholar has counted 56
pieces of correspondence between Japan and Trinh or Nguyen Vietnam from 1599 to
1764; the correspondence comes from both sides and ranges from letters from rulers to
letters from mid-level officials." Another example of the Nguyen involvement in
promoting foreign trade, in this case also with Japan, was in 1604 with Nguyen Hoang's
adoption as his son Hunamoto Yabeiji, the first envoy of the Tokugawa regime to
Cochinchina. The use of family ties in promoting trade continued in 1619, when Nguyen
Hoang's son and successor, Nguyen Phuc Nguyen (r. 1613-1635), married one of his
daughters to a Japanese merchant who became a noble in Cochinchina.' 4
12 Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, p.60.
13 See Kawamoto Kuniye, "The International Outlook of the Quangnam
(Nguyen) Regime as Revealed in Gaiban Tsuusho," in Ancient Town of
Hoi An (International Symposium March 1990)(Hanoi, Gioi Publishers,
1993), pp. 109-112; see also Robert L. Innes, The Door Ajar: Japan's
Foreign Trade in the Seventeenth Century (PHD Dissertation, University
of Michigan, 1980), p. 64.
14 Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, p. 64; Vu Minh Giang, "The Japanese
Presence in Hoi An," in Ancient Town of Hoi An, p. 138.
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Thus Hoi An, with the encouragement of the Nguyen rulers, was thrown
open to the world to trade. As the Italian Jesuit Missionary Borri was to note in the early
1600s, "the King ofCochin-China gave free admittance to all nations whatfoever," despite
attempts by the Dutch and Portuguese to exclude each other.'5sUnlike many other regional
economies, the government imposed no monopolies on goods, at least initially, with the
exception of royal monopolies on calambac and birdnests and later gold.'6 Trade duties
"s Borri lived in Cochinchina from 1618-21 (See Part V below). See Borri's
Cochinchina: Containing many Admirable Rarities and Singularities of
that Countrey (1633), translated and reprinted in John Pinkerton, A
General Description of the Best and Most Interesting Voyages and
Travels in All Parts of the World, (London, England, Ninth Volume,
1811), pp. 796-7.
16 Borri noted royal monopolies on calambac and birdnests. See Borri's
Cochinchina: Containing many Admirable Rarities in Pinkerton, A
General Description of the Best and Most Interesting Voyages and
Travels, (Ninth Volume), pp. 778-9. Li Tana, however, suggests that the
royal monopoly on calambac was not imposed until the second half of the
17* century. See Nguyen Cochinchina, pp. 82-3. As described by the
French trader Pierre Poivre around 1750 (see Part V below), there are
three grades of eaglewood; the finest grade and most expensive is the
resinous, waxy heart known as calambac. Apparently the royal monopoly
covered only this grade. Poivre's account also noted that the king owned
his own gold mine and that "the tyranny and miserliness of the king swal-
low up everything," suggesting a defacto royal monopoly on gold. The
account also noted a royal monopoly on ivory and complained that "trade
is restricted and carried out clandestinely. Expensive commodities like
gold, eaglewood, raw ivory and silk are not sold publicly. To obtain any,
one has to scheme and carry on dealings in secret, curry favour with the
mandarins and chiefs, who have to be bribed, or otherwise one is a target
for plunder or ruinous annoyances." See "Description of Cochinchina,
1749-50" in Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents on the
Economic History of Cochinchina (Dang Trong), 1602-1777, Li Tana and
Anthony Reid, eds. (Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
1993), pp. 88, 90-92. In addition to gold, calambac and birdnests, Charles
Wheeler also suggests there were royal monopolies over cinnamon, pepper
and silver (though Cochinchina actually had very limited amounts of
silver), with the cinnamon, pepper and other monopolies farmed out to
relatives of the king or local traders. See Charles Wheeler, Cross Cultural
(continued...)
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were also initially were kept low. In the latter part of the 17' century, however, trade
duties were raised, at least for European traders. By the mid-to-late 18 century, trade
duties for European traders had soared and were much higher than duties on Asian
traders. Thus the trend is one of gradually increasing duties around the turn of the 18'
century, with a substantial increase in the mid 1750s, perhaps to help fund a royal
construction program begun in 1754. "
16 (...continued)
Trade and Trans-Regional Networks in the Port of Hoi An: Maritime
Vietnam in the Early Modern Era (PHD Dissertation, Yale University,
2001), pp. 165-6.
17 Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, pp. 82-3; Le Quy Don's Phu Bien Tap Luc
(Frontier Chronicles) indicates that by the early 1770s, the arrival taxes
alone on European ships were 8000 quan, as compared with 4,000 quan
for ships from Macao and Japan, 3,000 quan for ships from Shanghai and
Canton, 2,000 quan for ships from Fujian, Siam and the Philippines, and
not more than 500 quan for ships from other ports. See "Miscellaneous
Nguyen Records Seized in 1775-6," in Southern Vietnam under the
Nguyen: Documents on Economic History, pp.1 15-116. (However, the
account of Robert Kirsop, an English trader who visited Hoi An in 1750,
suggests that the size of the entrance fee varied and was based at least in
part on the size of the vessel and the type of goods it carried, as opposed
to a fixed fee based on the vessel's origin. This entrance fee was apparently
generally negotiated with the King's direct representative in the capital. At
another point in his narrative, however, Kirsop suggests that the ship from
Macao payed a flat, yearly duty of 3,000 quan in return for an exemption
from customs duties, and that the same flat fee for Chinese junks ranged
from 1,000 to 2,000 quan; if so, a comparison with Le Quy Don's figures
(from the early 1770s) indeed suggests that the entrance fee had risen over
the 20 year period. See Robert Kirsop,"Some Account of Cochinchina," in
Alexander Dalrymple's Oriental Repertory, Volume I (second number;
published in two parts from April 1791 to April 1797; Volume I published
in four numbers from April 1791 to January 1793), pp. 242-3.)) This
distinction between European traders and Asian traders supports the view
of some commentators who suggest that the Nguyen encouraged Asian
traders - especially Chinese and Japanese - but discouraged European
traders, perhaps out of fear (no doubt justifiable)of European power.
Indeed, many European traders complained about trade conditions in
Cochinchina. See, for example, the comments of Alexander Hamilton,
(continued...)
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cash, copper, and later tutenag [zinc], mainly Chinese but also Japanese, which helped
the Vietnamese government to keep up with the indigenous demand for money."
Whitmore also notes that Nguyen Cochinchina was evidently dependent on the output
of a Japanese mint which ran from 1660 to 1684 and produced coins specifically for
export.20
TheNguyenauthorities were aware ofthe importance ofoverseas coinage
in Cochinchina's economy and were concerned when the overseas coinage market began
to dry up in the late 1600s. The Nguyen were so concerned with Japan's attempts
beginning in the mid 1680s to limit the outflow of specie (see Part III below for more on
Japanese foreign trade) that they sent a letter to Japan in 1688 describing how in
Cochinchina there were "many economic activities" but the Nguyen were incapable of
coining the much-needed money. The letter went on to request that Japan make coins
for circulation in Cochinchina.2 ' Japanese coin imports into Cochinchina, already
declining as a result of policies instituted by the Japanese government in the 1680s,
received a further blow in the 1710s when Japanese foreign trade ground to a virtual halt.
Although Chinese coins were to some extent able to fill the void before China began
prohibiting copper outflows, royal extravaganza and population growth further increased
the demand for coinage. The increasing monetization of the Cochinchinese economy in
which cash was the medium of exchange rather than goods or labor (for example, in the
20 Ibid, quote from p. 369; p. 383.
21 Kuniye, "International Outlook," in Ancient Town of Hoi An, pp. 115-6. It
may have been the closure of the copper mint in 1684 referred to in the
previous paragraph that prompted this letter.
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What emerged from this open door economic policy in Cochinchina was
an economy based on exports and imports and money which encouraged trade
specialization within Cochinchina. Financing this import-export economy and the
accompanying expansion to the south was cash, mostly in the form of imported copper
currency.' 8 Copper coins, traditionally imported primarily from China as Vietnam's
copper reserves were limited, had long been a feature ofthe north Vietnamese economy,
and even prior to the 1600s, Vietnam was no stranger to the vagaries of shortages in
copper cash."' However, with Cochinchina's explosion of economic growth tied closely
to foreign trade and the use of coinage as a medium of exchange, the Nguyen economy
became dependent on foreign coinage - mostly Japanese and then Chinese - in a way in
which the economy of the north had never been. As Whitmore describes, "it was foreign
17 (...continued)
traveling to Cochinchina in the late 1600s, who said that the "Cochin-
Chinefe draw one-half of the cuftomes and taxes raifed in Cambodia by
commerce and merchandizing, but they give little encouragement for
ftrangers to trade with them." Alexander Hamilton, A New Account of the
East Indies, reprinted in Pinkerton's A General Collection of the Best and
Most Interesting Voyages and Travels (Eighth Volume), p. 481. John
Whitmore, however, notes that the pattern of duties listed above indicates
that the more important the merchants were to the Nguyen, the lower the
duty, and that importance was measured by actual trade goods rather than
bullion (thus Chinese and Southeast Asian traders who brought trade
goods - silks and spices - received more favorable treatment than Japanese
and Europeans who brought silver (though we must remember that the
Japan trade dried up in the early 1700s, long before the duties listed above
were imposed in the 1750s)). See John Whitmore, "Vietnam and the
Monetary Flow of Eastern Asia, Thirteenth to Eighteenth Centuries," in
Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds, J.F.
Richards, ed., (Durham, N.C., Carolina Academic Press, 1983), p. 381.
18 Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, pp. 78-98. See Part VI below for more
discussion of the effects of trade on the Cochinchina economy.
19 Whitmore, "Vietnam and the Monetary Flow of Eastern Asia," p. 367.
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case of taxes) also spurred demand for coins. The resulting shortage by the 1740s
forced Cochinchina into minting coins - using copper and zinc (tutenag) - for itself. This
policy, however, was nothing short of disastrous and led to severe inflation, and when
combined with the imposition ofnew shipping duties, led to a major decrease in overseas
trade by the late 1760s.22 This decrease in foreign trade, which had long been a primary
source of revenue for the Nguyen rulers, meant that the Nguyen had to turn elsewhere
22 Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, pp.94-7; see also Whitmore, "Vietnam and
the Monetary Flow in Eastern Asia," pp. 370-3. The Pierre Poivre account
from 1750 describes how the Nguyen were forced to buy copper from the
Chinese to mint coins (presumably because there were no local reserves
and the supply from Japan had dried out), and explains that since the
Chinese were prohibiting copper exports the Nguyen were using tutenag
to mint coins, thus accounting for why tutenag was the primary Chinese
export to Cochinchina at the time. The account further described the
currency problems facing Cochinchina and the inflation which had hit the
local economy. See "Description of Cochinchina, 1749-50," in Southern
Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents on Economic History, pp. 85-7.
Kirsop in 1750 also noted how the Chinese brought to Cochinchina
tutenag which was "all engroffed by the king" (meaning a monopoly?) and
how a type of tutenag was the only currency of the country. See Kirsop,
"Some Account of Cochin China," p. 245. Le Quy Don, the Trinh
scholar/official sent south after the Trinh occupied Hue in 1774, also
commented upon the instability of the monetary supply and Nguyen
reliance on foreign sources. Le Quy Don noted how there was no copper
in south Vietnam and the Nguyen had to obtain raw copper from China
and Japan. He claims the Nguyen ruler accepted the suggestion of a
Chinese man to buy tin from the Dutch and use it to mint coins. He then
notes that the government began to mint lead coins of good quality;
however, the court began to store copper coins which as a result became
more expensive. Consequently, people began casting their own lead coins,
the price of which dropped drastically, so much so that local people and
overseas traders refused to accept lead coins. See "Miscellaneous Nguyen
Records Seized in 1775-6," in Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen:
Documents on Economic History, pp. 114-5; see also Alexander Wood-
side, "Central Vietnam's Trading World in the Eighteenth Century as Seen
in Le Quy Don's 'Frontier Chronicles'," in Essays into Vietnamese Pasts,
John Whitmore and Keith Taylor, eds. (Ithaca, New York, Southeast Asia
Program, 1995) p. 167.
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for funding. Thus the Nguyen increased domestic taxes, which only served to spur local
discontent, and it was from one of these areas which experienced a tax increase that the
Tayson rebellion sprang.23 With government revenue down, the inflationary economy
spinning out of control and other pressing domestic matters arising, the Nguyen regime
was in no position to resist effectively either the Trinh advance or the Tayson rebellion.
Reliance on overseas trade, so critical to the development of Nguyen Cochinchina, would
ultimately be a major factor in the decline of the regime.
Hoi An was a clear beneficiary ofNguyen Cochinchina's opening itselfup
to foreign trade. Hoi An was Nguyen Cochinchina's commercial window to the world
and it was through Hoi An that the bulk of trade in Cochinchina passed. As we will see
below, Hoi An grew into a thriving international port as a result of the Nguyen decision
to throw open its economy to international trade and commerce and its assignment of
Hoi An as the designated place for foreign trade and location of foreign trading factories
23 Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, pp. 147-8. Li Tana clearly believes that
revenue from overseas trade was long one of the regime's main sources of
funds (see pps. 98, 147-8). This view contrasts sharply with Charles
Wheeler, who seems to argue, somewhat obtusely and rather unconvinc-
ingly, that "by the early eighteenth century, foreign trade's importance,
relative to the rest of Dang Trong's economy, had diminished. By this time,
the economy, and in turn the Nguyen state derived its wealth from com-
merce conducted at the local and regional levels, and inter-regional trade.
Both economy and state in Dang Trong did rely on foreign sources for
their money supply, and the evidence of the state's dependence upon
metal's trade was demonstrated by the currency crisis that the drop in
foreign trade generated during the 1760's. If the entire economy were
dependent upon foreign trade, however, we would see a decline in most
areas of the economy, from tolls to sugar and even rice production. But no
such indications are found in eighteenth century sources." See Wheeler,
Cross-Cultural Trade and Trans-Regional Networks, pp. 170-1.
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in Cochinchina. Hoi An's internationalism and multiculturalism derived from the most
part from this linkage to foreign trade. Yet it was also this reliance on foreign trade
which would lead to Hoi An's decline by the 1770s.
Mass immigration to the south was another feature of Nguyen rule. In
addition to increasing the area ofNguyen power and rule, this "southern expansion" also
helped fuel the economy. Prior to the Nguyen push south, central Vietnam had been part
of the polyethnic, indianized Chain kingdom whose customs were quite different from
the traditional north. Indeed, the two kingdoms had frequently clashed in the past.
Nguyen Hoang, however, brought many Vietnamese Mandarins and their families south
with him and encouraged many others to move. Population pressure in the north, famine
and war also contributed to the push south. Economic opportunity in the rapidly
developing Cochinchinese economy undoubtedly also served to "pull" many Vietnamese
south. Instead of the previous separate, scattered population movements south, there
was after 1600 a "popular movement" from north to south which was encouraged by the
regime. 24
Nguyen Cochinchina also actively welcomed Chinese immigration, which
likely began steadily in the last few decades of the 16' century and took off after the
Ming dynasty was overthrown by the Manchus in 1644 (see Part III below for more on
Chinese immigration in general). Nguyen encouragement of Chinese immigration and
overall favorable treatment of the Chinese was in marked contrast to the more restrictive
24 Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, Chapter Two, especially pp. 22-4.
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(and at times oppressive) policies of the Trinh in the north." Intermarriage between
immigrant Chinese and local women was common and assisted the integration process.
Most of the Chinese in Cochinchina would settle in three places: the Hue-Hoi An area,
the Mekong delta area, and the Ha Tien area in southwest Vietnam. In the Hue/Hoi An
area, the Chinese were mostly merchants (see Part V below for more on the Chinese in
Hoi An). In 1679, some 3,000 Ming loyalist soldiers on some 50 ships who were fleeing
the Qing landed near Hue and were promptly resettled in the Bien Hoa, north of modern-
day Saigon in the Mekong Delta area. This site was abandoned in 1778 due to the
Tayson rebellion, with most of the Chinese moving to Cholon, adjacent to Saigon, and
after the 1780s Saigon/Cholon developed rapidly into a major trading area (see Part VII
below). Sometime in the late 1600s, a Chinese named Mac Cuu along with 400 followers
(soldiers, intellectuals and their families) arrived in the Ha Tien area and began to settle
it. In 1708 Mac Cuu submitted to the Nguyen and was named governor of the territory.
Ha Tien would grow into a thriving port by the mid 1700s primarily because of Chinese
traders. It was destroyed by the Siamese in the early 1770s and then again by the Tayson,
and thereafter was a fairly insignificant port.26
Perhaps most importantly, as Li Tana has noted the "southern expansion"
gave rise to a new sense of Vietnamese identity. Cochinchina, already somewhat of a
25 See Fujiwara Riichiro, "Vietnamese Dynasties' Policies Toward Chinese
Immigrants," Acta Asiatica 18 (1970), pp. 43-69.
26 See Nguyen Hoi Chan, "Some Aspects of the Chinese Community in
Vietnam, 1650-1850," Papers on China (Volume 24), from Seminars at
Harvard University (1971), pp. 104-124.
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cultural mix, became a polyethnic melting pot as Vietnamese from the north were
"localized" by adopting local customs, especially Cham but also customs from groups
from the central highlands. There was an "eclectic weaving of indigenous spirits and
beliefs into a syncretic (Vietnamese) Buddhist framework, a hybrid religious system that
bestowed moral legitimacy on Nguyen authority...." Mahayana Buddhism - very
syncretic and open and far different from the Confucian ethos which influenced the north
- provided the means to incorporate the alien Cham and other cultures.2" Perhaps the
best example of this integration was the gradual incorporation of the Cham goddess Po
Nagar into the Vietnamese pantheon. 8 As Li Tana also points out, foreign Buddhist
monks such as Da Shan were also welcomed and certainly enriched the religious and
cultural landscape. 29
Thrown into this open and evolving cultural and religious mix were the
Jesuit missionaries, who first reached Cochinchina in the 1610s as an alternative to Japan,
which was beginning to limit missionary activity. Although the number of converts
cannot be ascertained with any certainty, the intermittent bans on Jesuit activity and
occasional persecution of Christians in Cochinchina are certainly indications that the
27 Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, pp.99, 102-3.
28 For an excellent description of this process of incorporation, see Nguyen
The Anh's "The Vietnamization of the Chain Diety Po Nagar," in Essays
into Vietnamese Pasts, pp. 42-50.
29 Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, pp. 108-9.
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Jesuits were making their presence felt.?" Two of the most famous of these missionaries
were the Jesuits Christophoro Borri and Alexander de Rhodes (See Part V below), both
of whom were in Cochinchina in the first half of the 17' century. Macao provided a
convenient regional base for missionary activities in the South China Sea region, and in
Cochinchina European missionaries were often assisted by Japanese Christians."
This polyethnic society was undoubtedly reflected in the daily life of Hoi
An. In addition to the Vietnamese Mandarins, Japanese residents, Chinese residents, the
occasional western resident, the temporary visitors from overseas waiting for the winds
to change to return home, there were certainly also individuals of the polyethnic mix
described above as well as Christian converts. This polyglot mix of people must have
lent a great sense of excitement to the air. When one considers that the original
Vietnamese themselves were in effect foreigners from the north who were beginning to
30 Micheline Lessard notes that Catholics claimed 82,500 converts in all of
Vietnam by 1639; Rhodes reported 300,000 converts in 1650. See
Micheline Lessard, "Curious Relations: Jesuit Perceptions of the Vietnam-
ese," in Essays into Vietnamese Pasts, p. 142. Another account from 1642
indicates that "there are a fair number of Roman Catholics around Cape
Varella, Gambier, and also in Cadjangh, but their number is on the wane
because the king has expelled the papists from the country." See "A
Japanese Resident's Account," in Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen:
Documents on Economic History of Cochinchina, p.32. Poivre, however,
noted in 1750 that there were only about 50,000 Christians in
Cochinchina. See "Description of Cochinchina, 1749-50," in Southern
Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents on Economic History of
Cochinchina, p. 82.
31 See Nguyen Van Hoan, "Hoi An - Vietnam's Center for Cultural Contacts
with the World in the 17m Century," in Ancient Town of Hoi An, p.177.
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integrate into local society, Hoi An in its heyday must have been an excellent place for
people watching.
PART III. THE INTERNATIONAL PICTURE.
If the creation of a new state in central Vietnam was the first leg upon
which Hoi An's growth was supported, the concurrent boom in international trade and
commerce was the second. As Anthony Reid has so eloquently written, the years from
1450 to 1640 were an "age of commerce" for Southeast Asia which saw trade take off
and reach unprecedented heights, peaking from about 1570 to 1640. This boom in
commerce in Southeast Asia was fueled at first primarily by Chinese and Indian demand
for Southeast Asian products, and reached its peak when Japan and various European
countries began to get involved. 32 The rise in trade resulted over the years in the
flourishing of a number ofentrepots in Southeast Asia such as Manila, Malacca, Banten,
Aceh, Ayutthaya, Pattani, Pnom Penh, Pegu and Hoi An, to name but a few. With
respect to Hoi An, although these four areas of trade - China, Japan, India, and Europe -
were certainly interrelated, it is clear that Hoi An itself was less directly affected by the
India trade, was more affected by the European trade, and was intricately involved in the
32 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680,
Volume Two, Expansion and Crisis (Chiang Mai, Thailand, Silkworm
Books, 1993), especially pp. 12-16.
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China and Japan trade. Because economic demand from China and Chinese traders were
so critical to the development of Hoi An, our discussion starts with China.
A. The Chinese.
Contact between China and Southeast Asia dates back to the beginning
of the Christian era. Prior to the Sung dynasty (960-1278), however, this contact for the
most part consisted of Southeast Asians coming to China, as opposed to Chinese
venturing to Southeast Asia.33 During the Sung, and especially the Southern Sung
(1127-1278), Chinese shipping developed rapidly along China's southeastern coast and
Chinese sailors began to venture to the Nanyang (the'Southern Seas' or Southeast Asia).
The Sung regime actively encouraged trade, and most of the Chinese shipping and trade
was private in nature. Private trade and shipping to the Nanyang continued to grow
under the encouragement of the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1278-1368).M
33 See O. W. Wolters, Early Indonesian Commerce (Ithaca, New York,
Cornell University Press, 1967).There were a number of Chinese pilgrims,
such as I Ching, who passed through the region during this early period on
their way to the west, but this number appears to be very limited. South-
east Asians came to China to deliver 'tribute' and to trade, two phenomena
which are closely linked; this growing trade in the first millennium resulted
from increased demand in China for Southeast Asian products.
34 See Wang Gungwu, The Chinese Overseas: From Earthbound China to
the Quest for Autonomy (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press,
2000).The Yuan is perhaps better known for its efforts in assembling the
first great Chinese navies; these navies were sent to Java in the 1290s in
failed attempts to conquer that island. A combination of robust private
trade in the region as well as deserters and those left behind from the Yuan
navies likely led to the first settlements of Chinese in the Nanyang, though
these settlements must have been quite small.
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The Ming dynasty (1368-1644) immediately banned private trade and
overseas travel and insisted that all contact and trade with foreigners be conducted within
the traditional tributary system. " Such developments were not welcomed by China's
southeastern coastal provinces (Zhejiang, Guangdong, and especially Fujian), which had
come to rely on overseas trade as a principal means of survival. 36 Another element
working against the Ming ban was the series of naval expeditions the Ming sent out from
1403 to the early 1430s under the command of Zheng He. These missions were the last
great show of Chinese maritime power and reached as far as the African coast. The
motives of the Ming in dispatching these voyages are unclear, but it is likely these
missions were diplomatic and political in nature and were also intended to encourage
35 See O.W. Wolters, The Fall of Srivyaya in Malay History (Ithaca, New
York, Cornell University Press, 1970), and Wang, The Chinese Overseas.
36 Indeed, one wonders how effective the Ming ban really was during this
period, as the first recorded communities of Chinese in Southeast Asia
appear around the turn of the 15' century. See Pin Tsun Chang, "The First
Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia in the Fifteenth Century," in Emporia,
Commodities and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, Ptak and
Rothermund, eds. (Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991). These early
communities were located in Cambodia, Siam, Patani, Aceh, Palembang,
Brunei, Tuban and Gresik. Most Chinese in Southeast Asia at this time
were probably involved in trade and shipping as well as statecraft - accom-
panying tribute missions to China. See Anthony Reid, "Flows and
Seepages in Long Term Chinese Interaction with Southeast Asia," in
Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese,
Anthony Reid, ed. (St. Leonards, Australia, Allen & Unwin, 1996). We
can reasonably surmise that the existing Chinese communities in Southeast
Asia during the period of the ban became more assimilated into the local
cultures, as they were cut off from China (see Wang, The Chinese Over-
seas, pp. 50-51), but we should also bear in mind that these communities
were likely still quite limited in number and population (see J.A.C. Mackie
"Introduction," in Sojourners and Settlers, xxii).
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tribute missions and trade.37 One of the unintended effects of the missions, however,
was to increase Chinese demand for Southeast Asian products and thus encourage illegal
private trade outside the confines of the tributary system.38 After the voyages were
suddenly ended in the 1430s, a period of official Chinese isolation resumed.
The Ming trade and travel ban was suddenly lifted in 1567 (with the
exception of Japan) at the request of the southeastern provinces.39 Although the
effectiveness of the ban up to this point is questionable as illicit trade continued in the
second half ofthe 15t' and first half ofthe 1601 centuries, it is clear that Chinese trade and
immigration to Southeast Asia shot up after the recission of the ban. Growth in trade
and immigration would continue until the 1640s, after which a decline is evident. 1567
thus must be seen as a key turning point for the Chinese presence in the Nanyang. With
respect to trade, Chinese junks licensed to trade in Southeast Asia jumped from 50 per
year in 1568 to 88 per year in 1589 to 137 per year in 1597. Shipping levels are
"7 See Wang Gungwu, Community and Nation: China, Southeast Asia and
Australia (St. Leonards, Australia, Allen & Unwin, 2"d edition, 1992), pp.
108-115.
38 Reid, "Flows and Seepages," p. 29. It is also probable that a number of
Chinese from the Zheng He missions remained behind in Southeast Asia, a
repeat of the same phenomenon that resulted from the Yuan voyages.
39 Wang, Community and Nation, p.1 7.
40 See Anthony Reid, "The Unthreatening Alternative: Chinese Shipping in
Southeast Asia, 1567-1842," Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs,
Vol. 27/1-2 (1993, pp. 13-32) p.15; Yung Ho Tsao, "Chinese Overseas
Trade in the Late Ming Period," in Proceedings, Second Biennial Confer-
ence of International Association of Historians of Asia (Taipei, Taiwan,
October 1962, pp. 429-458), p. 431.
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important during this time not only because of their economic implications, but also as
a barometer of inunigration - Chinese immigrants (mostly from Fujian) arrived in
Southeast Asia mostly by ship.4'
Another important result from the 1567 decision to authorize private
trade was the official division of Chinese overseas trade into two routes, the "eastern
route" and the "western route". The eastern route led to the Philippines and the spice
islands of modern-day eastern Indonesia; the western route followed the Chinese coast
west, then headed south between Hainan Island and the Paracel Islands, hitting the
central Vietnamese coast, where it followed the coast south and then west, at which
point it could cross the Gulf of Siam to the north (heading for Ayutthaya) or to the south
heading to the eastern coast of the Malay peninsula. From there the route could either
head north through the Malacca Straits, or south along the Sumatran coast and then
4' Indeed, the numbers of Chinese in Southeast Asia seemed to increase
dramatically after 1567 along with the increased shipping. By 1602 there
were an estimated 20,000 Chinese living in Manila, by far the largest
concentration of Chinese in Southeast Asia. See Edgar Wickberg, The
Chinese in Philippine Life, 1850-1898 (New Haven and London, Yale
University Press, 1965), p. 6. There were also substantial Chinese com-
munities in Batavia, Hoi An, Banten, Pattani, Pnom Penh and Ayutthaya
by first part of the 17' century (see Reid, "Flows and Seepages," p. 39),
and Chinese traders could be found at most major ports ( see Wang, The
Chinese Overseas, p. 51). Although it has been argued that the recission
of the ban allowed the traditional Chinese practice of'sojourning' (tempo-
rary settlement in foreign lands, with the general intention to return to
China) to continue ( see Wang, The Chinese Overseas, pp. 50-1), the
period from the second half of the 16' to the first half of the 17' century
can also be seen as one in which many permanent communities of Chinese
were established in Southeast Asia.
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northern Javanese coast into the Java Sea. This western route varied little over time."
The key ports along this route were, at various times, Hoi An, then Pnom Penh and Ha
Tien, Ayutthaya, Johor, Malacca, Palembang and Jambi in Sumatra, and Banten and
Batavia in Java. A look at the 1589 licenses indicates that the total of 88 licenses granted
were evenly split between the eastern route and western route; of the 44 ships allowed
to go west, four were licensed for Hoi An.' Perhaps more importantly, Hoi An was
strategically positioned along the western route so that Chinese junks going to other
ports had the option of stopping by Hoi An. In other words, Hoi An's (or another port
located in central or south Vietnam) geographical location virtually ensured its exposure
to numerous Chinese vessels so long as the Chinese economy continued to hum along
and there was demand in China for goods from Southeast Asia, India and Europe.
By the mid-1500s, two hundred years of prosperity in China had fueled
an economic boom in China and Southeast Asia, a boom that was to peak from about
1570 to 1640. Indeed, China during this time was one of the drivers of the world
42 See Leonard Blusse, Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women
and the Dutch in VOC Batavia (Dordrecht, Holland, Foris Publications,
1986), pp. 111-113; Tsao, "Chinese Overseas Trade," p. 436; Leonard
Andaya, "Interactions with the Outside World and adaptation in Southeast
Asian Society," in The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Volume I:
From Early times to c. 1800, Nicholas Tarling, ed. (Cambridge, U.K.,
Cambridge University Press, 2' printing, 1994), p. 347.1 suspect this
route had long been the primary route to the west (a look at the map
indicates this is really the only way to go), but was simply formalized in
1567.
43 Tsao, "Chinese Overseas Trade," p. 421; Reid, "Unthreatening Alterna-
tive," p. 16.
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economy." China's primary export was silk as well as finished products such as
ceramics, and its primary import was silver - which it was in desperate need of - from
Japan and the Americas, along with various Southeast Asian products. Indeed, China
was a major "sink" of the world's silver supply, the production of which increased
dramatically in the second half of the 16 century as a result of the discovery of new
mines in Spanish America.45 Concurrently in the middle 1500s, Japanese production of
silver began to increase dramatically, which fueled a large jump in Japan's foreign trade
with silver serving as the primary export.46 Japan's primary import was Chinese silk, and
a flourishing trade market of Chinese silk for Japanese silver developed. However,
because of the continued Ming ban on direct trade with Japan after 1567, a large part of
this silver-silk trade was carried out in ports outside of China and Japan - much of it in
Southeast Asian ports, primarily Hoi An and Manila (see Section B below). Manila, after
the Spanish takeover in the early 1570s, had the additional lure for the Chinese as the
44 For a good summary of China's importance in the world economy during
this period, see Andre Frank, Reorient: Global Economy in the Asian Age,
(Los Angeles, CA., University of California Press, 1998).
45 For more on silver production, outflows and the massive amounts im-
ported by China, see Frank, Reorient, cited above; Ward Barrett, "World
Bullion Flows, 1450-1800,"in James Tracy, ed., The Rise of Merchant
Empires: Long Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750
(Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1990); and William
Atwell, "International Bullion Flows and the Chinese Economy Circa
1530-1650," Past and Present No. 95 (May 1982), pp. 68-90, and "Some
Observations on the 'Seventeenth Century Crisis' in China and Japan,"
Journal of Asian Studies Volume XLV, No.2 (February 1986), pp. 223-
244,
46 See Robert L. Innes, The Door Ajar: Japan's Foreign Trade in the
Seventeenth century, PHD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1988, pp.
21-26.
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Asian terminal for the vast amounts of silver produced in Spanish America, and Manila
was likely the center of the Chinese junk trade in Southeast Asia for the period from the
1570s until the 1640s. Macao also was an important port for the silk-silver trade, and
the Portugese were heavily involved in this trade (Macao to Nagasaki) until their
expulsion from Japan in 1639.
From the mid 1640s to the mid 1680s, Chinese shipping, and the Chinese
economy for a portion ofthis period, slowed dramatically, primarily due to internal chaos
in Chinaresulting from the Qing (1644-1910) conquest of China in the mid 1640s as well
as a global economic downturn. In the wake of resistance to the Qing in southern China,
trade and navigation bans were imposed by the Qing court from the mid 1650s until 1684
(the Qing believed that those involved in maritime trade supported resistance activities),
and the Qing also carried out a policy of forced relocation inland of the population
residing along the coast of Fujian. Ming resistance in the south was led by the Cheng
family, the first of whom, Cheng Chih Lung, was a smuggler-turned Ming official -
turned Qing official.47 Most of the Chinese shipping to Southeast Asia during this period
was likely controlled by the Cheng family, which controlled the coasts and shipping lanes
around southern China during this period.48 Cheng Chih Lung's son was the famous Ming
47 See Chin Keong Ng, Trade and Society: The Amoy Network on the China
Coast, 1683-1735, (Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1983), pp. 48-
52.
48 See Blusse, Strange Company, p. 117; Cheng Ko Cheng, ""Cheng Cheng
Kung's Maritime Expansion and Early Ching Coastal Prohibition," espe-
cially p. 233, and Chin Keong Ng, "The South Fujianese Junk Trade at
Amoy from the 17' to Early 19' Centuries," especially p. 303, both in
(continued...)
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loyalist Koxinga, whose efforts to resist the Qing were continued after his death in 1662
by his sons. It was during this period that Amoy city in Fujian province became a great
Chinese maritime center (though Fujian province itself had always been a maritime
center), and thereafter most ofthe Chinese Nanyang trade would originate from Amoy. 49
With the pacification of the south and the conquest of Taiwan - the Cheng family
stronghold - in 1683, the trade ban (including the ban with Japan). was lifted in 1684.
The number of Chinese ships sailing to Southeast Asia and the number of
Chinese immigrants to the region shot up again after 1684 as a result of the recission of
the trade ban.50 Although Reid has suggested that the number of Chinese ships visiting
the region did not return to the pre-1640 levels until the 1740s, there was a clear jump
in junk trade, especially to Batavia. In fact, the junk trade to Batavia reached its peak
48 (...continued)
E.B. Vermeer, ed., Development and Decline of Fukien Province in the
17 andl 8 Centuries, (Leiden, The Netherlands, E.J. Brill, 1990). See
also Seiichi, "Japanese Foreign Trade in the 6 and 17 * Centuries," Acta
Asiatica 30 (1976), p. 12, with respect to the impact of the Cheng family
on Chinese trade with Japan.
49 See Ng, Trade and Society. It should be noted that although the Qing bans
resulted in reduced trade and shipping and perhaps even immigration to
Southeast Asia, the Qing takeover of China in the 1640s did generate an
exodus of refugees and Ming loyalists from China to Southeast Asia,
especially Vietnam (no doubt due in part to Vietnam's geographical
proximity to China). For example, we saw in Part II above how in 1679 an
estimated 3000 Ming loyalists seeking refuge arrived in Cochinchina, and
as we shall see in Part V Section B, the Ming village inHoi An was
established around 1650.
so Ng, Trade and Society, p.55; Blusse, Strange Company, Chapter VI. Iwao
Seiichi in "Japanese Foreign Trade," p. 13, has also noted an explosion of
Chinese junk trade in Japan after 1683.
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from 1690 to 1740, and Batavia was likely the center of Chinese junk trade in Southeast
Asia during this time, similar to Manila in the period from the 1570s to the 1640s. For
other parts of the region, however, this second boom period of junk trade may have
lasted only until the 1710s.51 One reason the junk trade with Southeast Asia may have
slowed in the 1710s was another series of bans on trade and travel imposed by the Qing
from 1717 to 1727. These measures were largely directed at Manila and Batavia,
however, and the ban on trade with Vietnam was lifted after only six months.52 The
effectiveness of the ban is uncertain, but as noted above by the 1740s the junk trade had
reached its prior highs.
The 1684 recission also resulted in another substantial jump in Chinese
immigration to the region, which would lead to unsuccessful efforts by the Spanish in
Manila and the Dutch in Batavia to control immigration. This surge in immigration after
1684 brought a different type of Chinese settler to the region - manual laborers.
Although Chinese laborers and artisans had been coming to Manila and Batavia
throughout the 1600s, most Chinese communities in Southeast Asia up to the end of the
17' century were merchant communities. Around the turn of the 18' century and
51 Reid, "Unthreatening Alternative," pp. 17 and 23. For the Batavian trade,
see Blusse, Strange Company, Chapter VI.
52 See Blusse, Strange Company, pp. 131-5: Sarasin Viraphol, Tribute and
Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade 1652-1853 (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
University Press, 1977), pp. 55-6; Ng, Trade and Society, pp. 57-8; Reid,
"Unthreatening Alternative," p. 23. Reid suggests several other reasons
for the slowdown: the VOC trade monopoly, the decline in trade with
Japan after 1715, and trade doldrums for Siam in the last decade of the
seventeenth century.
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particularly in the western archipelago, there began to appear laborers' settlements,
usually composed almost exclusively of young Chinese males.53 The 186*century would
witness a continuing influx of this type of immigrant to Southeast Asia, and due to the
larger numbers of immigrants and continued contact with China we can surmise that less
assimilation into local societies occurred.
By the 1740s, Chinese junk trade in Southeast Asia had reached the
levels of about 110 per year found in the previous peak period of the early 17' century,
and the period from 1760 to 1840 is considered to be the boom years of the Chinese junk
trade as the number of Chinese vessels engaged in trade reached unprecedented levels.'
The center of the junk trade shifted from Batavia to Siam, which would maintain its
"3 See Carl Trocki, "Chinese Pioneering in the Eighteenth Century Southeast
Asia," in the Last Stand of Asian Autonomies: Responses to Modernity in
the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 1750-1900, Anthony
Reid, ed. (New York and London, St. Martin's Press and Macmillan Press
Ltd., 1997).
sa For numbers of vessels, see Reid, "Flows and Seepages," p. 43 (citing Ng
and Viraphol, who themselves derive the number IlOs not from statistical
evidence but rather a comment of a Chinese trade official based in Fujian).
For the period 1760-1840 as a golden age for Chinese junks, see Reid,
"Unthreatening Alternative," pp. 24-29. For a discussion of the commer-
cial expansion in Southeast Asia from the mid 18' to the mid 19' centu-
ries, see Anthony Reid, "A New Phase of Commercial Expansion in
Southeast Asia, 1760-1850," in Last Stand of Asian Autonomies, pp. 57-
81.
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position until the 1840s." Chinese immigration to the region, particularly that of the
lower economic class, continued steadily during this period.
What did the trends described above mean for Hoi An? We would expect
that Chinese trade with Hoi An would reach a peak from the late 16* century through
the early 1640s, then slow down from the 1640s to the 1680s during the early Qing
period. We could then anticipate another surge in trade beginning in the 1680s with the
recission of the trade bans, and possibly slowing down by the late 1710s, though the
effect of the 1717-1727 bans on Vietnam itself is unclear. We would then expect another
trade surge trade beginning in the 1740s and peaking from 1760 to the early 1800s. As
we will see below in Part V, however, Hoi An did not always follow the general
Southeast Asian pattern, especially after the 1760s. With respect to Chinese immigration,
the above trends indicate that we can expect a Chinese trading presence in Hoi An after
1567, with immigration - mostly of traders and merchants - continuing steadily until the
1640s. The nature of immigrants perhaps changed during the 40 year period from the
1640s to the 1680s, as many were Ming loyalists fleeing the Qing. After the early 1680s
we can expect another surge in immigrants, this time both traders/merchants and perhaps
manual laborers. Thereafter we can anticipate another upsurge in immigration beginning
in the 1740s as the junk trade reached another peak. Indeed, as we will see below in Part
ss See Viraphol, Tribute and Profit, Jennifer Cushman, Fields from the Sea:
Chinese Junk Trade with Siam during the Late Eighteenth and Early
Nineteenth Centuries (Ithaca, New York, Cornell Southeast Asia Program
Publications, 2'" edition, 2000); Reid, "Unthreatening Alternative," p. 26.
The VOC was in decline by the 1740s, and the Batavia trade was further
hurt by the 1740 massacre of an estimated 10,000 Chinese in the city. See
Blusse, Strange Company, pp.139-40.
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V, Hoi An did follow these general immigration trends, although the Chinese presence
in Hoi An was seemingly dominated by traders and merchants.
B. The Japanese.
We noted above how, at the same time the Chinese economy was
peaking beginning in the second half of the 16' century, Japanese production of silver
also began to increase dramatically as a result of new smelting techniques and
exploitation of new mines. This increased production resulted in a tremendous jump in
Japan's foreign trade, with silver serving as the primary export and silk as the primary
import. This silk-for-silver trade, with copper becoming increasingly important by the
second half ofthe 1600s, would characterize Japanese foreign trade until the early 18'
century. Yet because of the continued Ming ban on direct trade with Japan, a large part
of this silver-silk trade was carried out in ports outside of China and Japan - much of it
in Southeast Asian ports, primarily Hoi An and Manila. In addition to silk, the Japanese
also imported a number of Southeast Asian goods, such as deerskins, silk, sugar,
aromatic woods, etc.
In the early 1590s, in a reaction against growing piracy, the Japanese
government attempted to install some sort of order in the growing overseas trade by
instituting the shuin-jo or "red seal" trading system. Only ships which were issued the red
seal (these ships were called shuin-sen) were allowed to leave Japan and engage in trade
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overseas (a red seal was issued to one ship for a single voyage). 56 As reflected in the
1601-2 correspondence between Nguyen Hoang and Ieyasu, the Japanese authorities
actively encouraged trade and simultaneously took measures to ensure that overseas
authorities were aware of this red seal system.5 A review of the period between 1604
and 1635 (the system was abandoned after 1635) reveals that ofthe 356 red seals issued
during this time, 87 or 25% were for central Vietnam (Hoi An), and 56 or 17% were for
Philippines. Ships bound for Siam also claimed 56 seals, ships bound for Cambodia
claimed 44 seals or 12%, those bound for Tongking claimed 37 seals or 10%, those
bound for Taiwan claimed 36 seals or 10%, and those for Macao only 21 or 6%.5" Thus
Hoi An was the primary destination for the shuin-sen ships, accounting for one-quarter
of the total ships; the next biggest destinations were Manila and Siam with 17% each.
One may wonder why Hoi An was a primary destination for Japanese
ships given its much further distance from Nagasaki than both Macao and Manila; Innes
suggests that, in addition to the large Chinese presence (thus making it easy to obtain
precious Chinese silk), independent kingdoms such as Cochinchina were more receptive
56 Innes, Door Ajar, pp. 106-118.
57 See also Seiichi, "Japanese Foreign Trade," pp. 9-10, and Innes, Door
Ajar, Chapter Two, for more on Ieyasu's efforts to establish friendly
relations and promote trade with other Southeast Asian countries. In spite
of these measures, however, there were certainly unauthorized Japanese
ships engaging in trade while the shuin-jo system was in effect. See Innes,
Door Ajar, pp. 56 and 111.
58 Figures from Ines, Door Ajar, pp. 57-9.
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to the Japanese merchants than the European enclaves of Macao and Manila" We saw
earlier that Nguyen Cochinchina did indeed make concerted efforts to promote trade,
especially with Japan. Another factor may have been the ability of the Japanese to obtain
products from other parts of Southeast Asia in Hoi An (see section D below for a
discussion of Hoi An as a regional entrepot). Similarly, the availability in Hoi An of local
silk, though inferior in quality, as a substitute for Chinese silk. may have attracted
Japanese traders. Japanese suspicion of Europeans and missionaries may also have
played a role, especially with respect to Macao, though as noted Manila was an important
destination. For whatever reason, Hoi An was a major beneficiary of the Chinese silk -
Japanese silver trade in the first half of the 1600s, and the Japanese presence (and
influence) in Hoi An was at its apex during this period.
In 1630s and early 1640s, Japan initiated a series of measures that
resulted in a withdrawal of the Japanese presence overseas and changes in Japanese
trading practices. As Innes has shown, the reasons for these changes related primarily to
internal Japanese politics (including Japanese distrust of resident Jesuits) and were not
intended to result in a decrease in foreign trade. Indeed, although the nationalities of the
traders would change, the levels of trade were not significantly altered by these changes,
and trade levels maintained consistent patterns throughout most of the 17* century. 6
In 1635, Japan imposed a ban on overseas travel - Japanese (including traders) could no
longer travel or live overseas. In the same year, the Japanese limited Chinese traders to
59 Ibid.
60 Innes, Door Ajar, Chapters Two and Four, especially pp. 420-32.
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the port of Nagasaki with the Portugese; previously Chinese junks could trade all over
Japan. At this point there were three main foreign nations trading in Japan (the English
trading factory had closed in the early 1620s), all of whom were now confined to single
ports: the Chinese and the Portugese in Nagasaki, the Dutch in Hirado. In 1639 the
Japanese expelled the Portugese entirely and in 1641 the Dutch factory was relocated to
Nagasaki, and thus by the early 1640s only the Chinese and the Dutch (both operating
out of Nagasaki) were allowed to engage in trade with Japan. Chinese traders stepped
into the void left by the restrictions on individual Japanese trading and the withdrawal of
the Portugese. The Dutch also continued a steady and highly profitable trade with Japan,
but Chinese traders accounted for the vast majority of the trade through the early
1700s.61 Much of this trade continued to flow through Southeast Asian entrepots such
as Hoi An.
By the middle 1680s, however, in part because of the tremendous jump
in trade in 1684 after the recission of the Chinese trade ban, the Japanese became
concerned about the outflow of silver and copper (which by the end of the 17' century
had become a major export) and began limiting trade. These measures began to make
an impact after 1700 and culminated in 1715, with drastic declines in permitted trade and
outflows of silver and copper.62 The initial restrictions were on the value of goods the
Chinese and Dutch were allowed to import. These measures were followed by
61 Ibid. See also Appendix One.
62 See Innes, Door Ajar, pages 319-62: Seiichi, "Japanese Foreign Trade," p.
13.
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limitations on the number of vessels allowed to trade -70 to 80 for the Chinese, only 3-7
for the Dutch. These numbers were further reduced in the early 1700s, and by 1715 the
door was effectively shut, with the Chinese allowed only 30 junks per year of limited
cargo value and the Dutch allowed only two ships, also of limited value. 63
Thus, for much of the period under discussion Japan would have a direct
impact on Hoi An and Cochinchina. Japanese contact and trade with Hoi An probably
dates back to the last few decades of the 16 century, and the presence of Japanese
merchants (if not residents) in Hoi An is evident by the early 1590s.6" As we will see
below in Part V, the Japanese maintained a significant presence in Hoi An for the first
half of the 1600s, as Hoi An was their primary foreign trading port. Despite the
withdrawal of Japanese traders in the 1630s, Hoi An would continue to play a major role
in trade with Japan, as Chinese traders, many based in or stopping by Hoi An, would
continue to service the Japanese trade. Although the Japanese were not nearly as visible
in Hoi An by the end of the 17' century, the Japanese still had a major influence on Hoi
An and Cochinchinese economy because Japan was, until the late 17'/early 18' century,
a primary source of silver, copper and specie for Nguyen Cochinchina. As we have seen,
the drying up of this source of bullion and specie resulted the shortage of coinage in the
1700s which had severe repercussions for the Nguyen regime.
63 Innes, Door Ajar, pp. 6, 319-62, Appendix One.
64 See Vu Minh Giang, "The Japanese Presence in Hoi An," in Ancient Town
of Hoi An, pp. 135-6.
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C. The Europeans.
It was not just the Chinese and Japanese which were involved with trade
in Asia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Europeans in the latter stages
of the 1500s also began to make their presence felt in Southeast Asia. The Portuguese
were the first to arrive in the region, taking Malacca in 1511, moving on to the spice
islands of eastern Indonesia shortly thereafter, establishing a presence in Macao in 1557
and then a trading post in Nagasaki in 1571. The posts in Macao and Nagasaki proved
especially fruitful with respect to the China-Japan silk-for-silver trade in which the
Portuguese were heavily involved from the 1570s through the 1630s; this was the
primary, as well as most profitable, area of Portuguese trade activity in the South China
Sea. One commentator has even suggested that the Portuguese "were able to secure a
more or less official monopoly of trade between the two countries"65 , though this seems
a bit exaggerated given the Chinese junk trade and the shuin-sen ships.
The Portuguese position in Asia suddenly atrophied in the late 1630s and
early 1640s, owing in large part to the ascendency of the Dutch. In 1635, the Dutch
expelled the Portuguese from Taiwan. In 1639, the Portuguese were expelled from
Nagasaki, which was a severe blow to their China-Japan trade. In 1641, the Dutch took
Malacca, which left Macao as the only Portuguese stronghold east of Goa (the
65 See C.R. Boxer, The Portuguese Sea Borne Empire, 1425-1825 (New
York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1969) p.63: see also C.R. Boxer, "Macao as
a Religious and Commercial Entrepot in the 16h and Seventeenth Centu-
ries," Acta Asiatica 26 (1974), pp. 64-90.
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Portuguese did maintain a fairly insignificant post in East Timor, which not until the
1970s would merit much attention). Thus by the second half of the 1600s, the
Portuguese influence in Asia was waning, though they would continue to be active in
trade. The Macao-Hoi An trade in particular would persist throughout most of the
1700s.
The Portuguese were the first Europeans to trade in Hoi An, perhaps as
early as the 1540s, and were certainly regular visitors to Hoi An beginning in the late
1500s." There were permanent Portuguese residents in Cochinchina, most likely in Hoi
An, perhaps as early as the 1580s, and trade was carried out by individual country traders
(as opposed to a single company conducting trade on behalf of a country, such as the
VOC). At least one, and perhaps two, Portuguese ship visited Hoi An annually from
Macao for most of the 17' and 18' centuries.67 With the Portuguese expulsion from
"6 As cited in footnote 2, Pierre Manguin has written extensively in French
on the Portuguese presence in Cochinchina, but thse works unfortunately
remain inaccessible to me. See Les Portugais Sur les Cotes du Vietnam et
du Campa (1972) and Les Nguyen, Macao et le Portugal: Aspects
Politiques et Commerciaux d'une Relation Priviligee en Mer de Chine
1773-1802 (1984).
67 See Chingho Chen, Historical Notes on Hoi An (Faifo), (Carbondale,
Illinois, Southern Illinois Press, Center for Vietnamese Studies, Mono-
graph Series IV, 1974), p. 19; Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, p.72, 88-9.
Chen draws a fine line between a permanent trading factory as opposed to
a permanent trading resident on the theory that since Portuguese trade was
conducted by individual country traders rather than a united trading
company such as the VOC or British East India Company, there could be
no permanent factory (but there could be permanent resident individuals).
For our purpose, it is sufficient to note that there was an established
Portuguese presence in Hoi An. Curiously, George Souza in his English
language study of the Portugese empire, The Survival of Empire:
(continued...)
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Japan inthe 1630s, Portuguese traders were more likely to focus on trade with Southeast
Asia, especially island Southeast Asia."'
The Portuguese impact on Cochinchina was manifested intwo other ways
in addition to trade. First, much of the weaponry acquired by Nguyen Cochinchina in
their fight against the Trinh came from the Portuguese, initially from the Bocarro gun
foundry in Macao (c. 1627-1680s) and then the Da Cruz gun foundry which was set up
in Cochinchina (established sometime inthe 1660s)!69 It was in part thanks to Portuguese
67 (...continued)
Portugese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea 1630-
1754, (Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1986), hardly
mentions Portuguese trade with Cochinchina, suggesting that Portuguese
trade with the Trinh was much more extensive. Manguin - see previous
note - would undoubtedly be useful here. Souza further notes that the
Portuguese rarely came to Tonkin after the 1660s (p. 119). An account of
Cochinchina from 1642 indicates that 10 to 12 Portuguese came to Hoi An
annually to trade, though presumably these gentlemen all came on one
ship. See "A Japanese Resident's Account," in Southern Vietnam under the
Nguyen: Documents on Economic History, p. 32. The Poivre account of
1749-50 noted that there was a resident Portuguese trader in Hoi An, and
each year one large Portuguese ship from Macao came bringing 'tutenag,
tea, porcelainand other goods from China for use by the Cochinchinese."
See "Description of Cochinchina," in Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen:
Documents on Economic History, p. 95. Robert Kirsop in 1750 noted the
presence of the Portuguese trading factory as well as the cozy relationship
the Portuguese seemed to have with the local government mandarins. See
Kirsop, "Some Account of Cochin China," pp. 244, 247.
68 Souza, The Survival of Empire, p. 87. Li Tana, citing Manguin, says four
Portuguese ships arrived in Hoi An in 1651, and more in 1650, and sug-
gests that Portuguese traded more with Cochinchina in the second half of
the 17' century as an alternative to Japan (Nguyen Cochinchina, p. 89).
This makes Souza's failure to explore Portuguese trade with Cochinchina
all the more puzzling.
69 See C.R. Boxer, "Macao as a Religious and Commercial Entrepot," pp.
(continued...)
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cannon that the Nguyen were able to hold off the Trinh. Second, many of the Jesuits
active in Cochinchina were also Portuguese. One commentator has suggested that there
was an intricate relationship between missionary activity and the supply of weaponry
from the Portuguese; when the guns and cannon "were slow in coming, the Nguyen
brought pressure on the missionaries and threatened to expel them, relaxing the
persecution when the coveted cannon arrived."7"
The Portuguese lost their position as the dominant western power in Asia
primarily because of the Dutch, who first arrived in Southeast Asia in the 1590s. With
the consolidation of Dutch trading companies into the VOC in 1602, the Dutch presence
in Asia grew rapidly. The Dutch captured the principal spice islands of eastern Indonesia
in the 1610s, founded a trading factory in Hirado in 1609 (which was to move to
Nagasaki in 1641), established Batavia (modern Jakarta) as their Asian headquarters in
1619, founded a trading post in Taiwan in 1624 (lost to Koxinga in 1662), established
numerous trading factories in Southeast.Asia in the 1630s, and as noted above generally
wreaked havoc on the Portuguese, their European rivals in Asia. The Dutch made
vigorous efforts throughout the 17*century to break into the China trade, but ultimately
69 (...continued)
78-9, and "Asian Potentates and European Artillery in the 16th-18th
Centuries: A Footnote to Gibson-Hill," Journal of the Royal Asiatic
Society Malayan Branch, Volume 38, Part 2 (No. 208, 1965), pp. 156-72,
p. 167.
70 See Boxer, "Macao as a Religious and Commercial Entrepot," p. 79.
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were unsuccessful." The Dutch, however, were very successful in breaking into the
Japan trade after the exclusion of the Portuguese from Japan in the 1630s, and the Japan
trade was the focus of Dutch economic activity in the South China Sea. The Dutch
continued to benefit from this trade until the 1660s, when they lost their trading post in
Taiwan and the Qing bans on trade began to be felt.'
Although the Dutch remained active in trading inthe South China Sea for
most of the 1600s, by the end of the century island Southeast Asia had become their
primary focus. By late 1680s the Dutch realized that they would not be successful in the
China trade; at roughly the same time, the Japanese started limiting trade and exports,
which naturally did not forebode well for what had been the mainstay of Dutch activity
in the South China Sea. The tremendous increase in Chinese trade and shipping
beginning in the middle 1680s (after the Qing opened trade up again) perhaps also
suggested to the Dutch the difficulties involved not only in breaking into the China
market (especially given the lack of an independent, nearby base after the Dutch were
expelled from Taiwan) but also in simply competing with Chinese shippers elsewhere.
In addition, by the middle 1660s the Dutch were able to exercise an effective monopoly
over the clove, nutmeg and mace trade, the production of which was based in the eastern
7 See John E. Wills, Pepper, Guns and Parleys: The Dutch East India
Company and China 1622-1681, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University
Press, 1974); Leonard Blusse, "No Boats to China: The Dutch East India
Company and the Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade, 1635-1690,"
Modern Asian Studies 30, 1 (1996), pp. 51-76.
n See generally Blusse, "No Boats to China," and Seiichi, "Japanese Foreign
Trade," pp. 14-18.
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archipelago. Lastly, Batavia was thriving as a trading entrepot, especially after the Dutch
took effective control over Banten in 1682, and the Dutch were increasingly drawn into
the affairs of Java. These factors all pointed to the Dutch concentrating on island
Southeast Asia.
Thus, Dutch trade in Vietnam should be seen primarily in the context of
Japanese trade in that the Dutch used Vietnam to obtain Southeast Asian goods as well
as Chinese goods to supply the Japanese market in exchange for Japanese silver. The
Dutch established a factory in Tongking in 1637 (not coincidentally after the withdrawal
ofthe Japanese from foreign trade in 1635) which lasted until 1700 and became the focus
of Dutch trade in Vietnam. From Tongking the Dutch obtained prized silk to sell in
Japan; this trade was at its zenith in the 1640s to early 1650s."3 The Dutch relationship
with Nguyen Cochinchina was uneasy at best. The Nguyen were irked by the close Dutch
relationship with the north; the Dutch were irked by their inability to break into the trade
at Hoi An (likely because of Japanese dominance in the 1620s and 30s) and Nguyen
treatment of sailors and salvaged goods from shipwrecks.7 The Trinh tried to use the
73 Blusse, "No Boats to China," p. 68.
7 Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, p.73 and Appendix 3; Frederic Mantienne,
"Indochinese Societies and European Traders: Different Worlds of Trade?
(17th-18th Centuries)," in Trade and Navigation in Southeast Asia (14th-
19th Centuries, Nguyen The Anh and Yoshiaki Ishizawa, eds. (Sophia
University, Tokyo, L'Harmattan Inc., Paris, 1999), pp. 113-126, p. 118;
"The End of Dutch Relations with the Nguyen State, 1651-2," in Southern
Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents on Economic History, pp. 33-7.
Buch has written extensively in Dutch on Dutch-Vietnamese relations
during this time, but these materials remain inaccessible to me because of
my inability to read Dutch. See W.J.M. Buch Nederlander met Annam in
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Dutch to vanquish the Nguyen, and indeed the Dutch were drawn into several military
encounters with the Nguyen, but were severely routed in at least one encounter in 1643.7
The Dutch were in Hoi An as early as 1602, as evidenced by an account
of frustrated Dutch traders searching for pepper in Cochinchina. 7 6 The Dutch established
a trading factory in Hoi An from 1636 to 1641, and (after their disastrous military
encounter of 1643) tried again in 1651, signing a commercial treaty with the Nguyen.
The 1651 treaty allowed the Dutch to exercise "free and frank trade" in addition to
establishing a trading factory in Hoi An; the Dutch were also granted the right of
extraterritoriality and exemption oftrade duties, perhaps indicating that the Nguyen were
indeed serious in encouraging trade with the Dutch. The Dutch chose as the site of the
factory the place where the original Dutch factory of 1636-41 had stood, which had
apparently been owned by a Japanese who sold it back to the Dutch for 500 Japanese
taels; the place was "a stone house and two neat godowns or warehouses, and well
planted with all kinds of fruit trees....""7 However, things quickly fell apart and the
(...continued)
de XVIIe Eeun (1925) and De Oost-Indische Compagnie en Qinam
(1929).
75 Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, Appendix 3.
76 See "The Trials of a Foreign Merchant - Letter by Jeronimus Wonderaer
from Hoi An, 1602," in Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents
on Economic History, pp. 6-26.
"7 See "The End of Dutch Relations with the Nguyen State," in Southern
Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents on Economic History, pp. 33-7.
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factory only lasted until 1654.78 The Dutch would not return to Cochinchina or Hoi An
until the 1750s, an absence of almost 100 years. 9
Ofthe other three European powers involved in Southeast Asia, none had
much of a direct impact on Cochinchina during this period. The English were the most
active in the South China Sea, and were interested primarily in developing the China
trade and Japanese trade. However, for most of the 17' century their primary trading
post east of India was at Banten, before they were kicked out by the Dutch in 1682. The
English did establish minor trading factories in Hirado (1613-1623) and Tongking (1672-
1697). The English also made efforts to open up trade with Cochinchina, but these
efforts were all unsuccessful. The first attempt, a mission from the Hirado factory in
1613, ended in disaster when the chief trader, Tempest Peacock, was killed under
mysterious circumstances. Richard Cocks, the head English factor in Hirado from 1615
to 1622, dispatched several more missions to Cochinchina, all for naught." In addition,
nothing came from 1695 mission headed by Thomas Bowyear, sent by the East India
Company to open commercial relations and possibly establish a factory.8 ' The English
78 Reid, Age of Commerce, p. 305; Chen, Historical Notes on Hoi An, p. 22.
79 See Mantienne, "Indochinese Societies and European Traders," p. 115
(citing Buch); Chen, Historical Notes on Hoi An, p.722 (citing Maybon).
90 See The Diary of Richard Cocks, Cape Merchant in the English Factory
in Japan, 1615-1622, (London, printed for the Hakluyt society, 1883),
Volumes I and II.
81 Alastair Lamb, The Mandarin Road to Old Hue: Narratives of Anglo-
Vietnamese Diplomacy from the 17 h Century to the Eve of the French
Conquest, (London, England, Chatto & Windus, 1970), Part One. See
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did establish a factory in Pulau Condore for a few years in the very early 1700s, but this
had little impact.
Beginning around the last decade of the 17" century, British trade with
China began to pick up, a circumstance which likely contributed to the closure of their
factories in Tongking and the failure ofthe post at Pulau Condore. By 1710, British trade
was increasingly focused on Canton, and by the mid 1700s British country traders were
common in the South China Sea. We can speculate that this increased British presence
in the South China Sea, with Canton as the main Chinese trading center for foreigners,
perhaps led to an increased presence of individual British traders in Hoi An as a way
station (not as a primary market) for vessels en route to Canton. However, the British
were at no time a significant presence in Hoi An.
The second remaining Europeanpower, the French, had little contact with
Cochinchina until the 1700s and even then the French were more influential as
missionaries rather than traders. The French made little effort to establish trade with
Vietnam except for several missions in the mid 1700s, none of which produced results.'
The final European power in Asia, the Spanish, were influential by virtue of their
'" (...continued)
Part V, Section B below for more on Bowyear's visit to Hoi An.
82 These missions were the Poivre mission of 1749-50 (see Part V, Section C
below), which although a failure produced a wonderful description of
Cochinchina (see "Description of Cochinchina, 1749-50," in Southern
Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents on Economic History, pp.60-97),
and a mission in 1748 led by one Dumont (see Lamb, Mandarin Road, p.
61).
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presence in Manila (established 1571), which became a thriving entrepot primarily as a
result of the silver flowing in from America. Generally speaking, however, the Spanish
paid little attention to their Philippine empire and did not trade to any significant degree
anywhere else in Southeast Asia.
D. Regional Trade Links.
We have seen how Hoi An thrived as a trading port because of the
Chinese silk-Japanese silver connection, and we will see below in Parts IV and VI how
another feature of Hoi An which attracted foreign traders was its position as the center
of local trade in central Vietnam and along the coast. In addition to these two factors,
Hoi An also functioned as a regional entrepot for goods from other parts of Southeast
Asia, which similarly drew Chinese, Japanese, European and other Southeast Asian
traders to the port city. Buch, in his study of the Dutch in Cochinchina, cites Hoi An's
position as a commercial entrepot with close links to other Southeast Asian countries as
the main reason why so many Chinese traders came to Hoi An; goods from Palembang,
Pahang, and Borneo could all be found in Hoi An. 83 Regional trade links with other areas
in Southeast Asia were maintained throughout the 17*and 18d *centuries. Unfortunately,
due to the lack of records the impact of this regional trade will likely never be fully
known, but we can get some measure of this trade by examining some primary source
material.
3 Cited in Chen, Historical Notes on Hoi An, p.20, and Li Tana, Nguyen
Cochinchina, p.69.
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In the 1620s, the Jesuit missionary Borrinoted that strangers come not
only from "Tunchim [Tonkin], Cambogia [Cambodia], Chincheos [Ha Tien], and other
neighboring places, but from the remoteft, as China, Macao, Japan, Manilla, and
Malacca, all of them carrying silver to Cochinchina, to carry away the commodities of
the country...."' Another account of Hoi An from 1642 notes trade and goods from
China, Siam and Laos, with annual visits from a Siamese ambassador. In addition to
ships from Japan and Canton, Thomas Bowyear, the Englishman sent to establish
commercial relations with Cochinchina in 1695, also saw ships coming from "Siam,
Camboya [Cambodia], Manilha, and of late from Batavia," each bearing goods from its
place of origin.16 Turning to the 18 * century, Le Quy Don's Phu Bien Tap Luc lists
duties on ships from Shanghai, Canton, Fujian, Hainan Island, Europe, Macao, Japan,
Siam, The Philippines, Palembang, Ha Tien and Tongking, indicating that at some time
or another ships from these places visited Hoi An. Le Quy Don also noted that the
84 See Borri's Cochinchina in Pinkerton, A General Description of the Best
and Most Interesting Voyages and Travels, p. 795. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, Borri's statement suggests that only silver was brought in from these
various ports, and not other local products, but nevertheless it does
demonstrate regional trade links. Presumably these Southeast Asian
traders were bringing in silver to satiate Chinese demand, another indica-
tion of how much silver China was sucking in; also interesting is that the
traders were bringing silver to Hoi An and not to China, indicating there
must have been a number of Chinese vessels around to ship the silver from
Hoi An to China. One also wonders if these Southeast Asian traders were
trading for Chinese goods as well as Cochinchinese goods.
85 See "A Japanese Resident's Account," in Southern Vietnam under Nguyen:
Documents on Economic History, p. 31.
86 See Lamb, Mandarin Road to Old Hue, pp. 52-3.
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abundance of goods available in Hoi An is "why the Chinese like to come and buy goods
to carry back." 87
The above accounts clearly indicate that Hoi An was part of a larger
regional trading network linking not only China and Japan but also Macao, Manila,
Tongking, Cambodia (PnomPenh), Ha Tien, Borneo, Laos, Siam (Ayutthaya), Malacca,
Palembang, Pahang (Malaysian peninsula), and Batavia; this network may well have
included Johor and Banten, both thriving regional ports at some point during the 1 7 *
and 181 centuries." Who were these carriers of regional commerce? Three different
87 See "Miscellaneous Nguyen Records Seized in 1775-6," in Southern
Vietnam under Nguyen: Documents on Economic History, p. 116. Curi-
ously, this list includes Japan, which means either that the list was very
outdated or, more likely, that a few Chinese vessels were still plying the
waters between Japan and Hoi An.
88 From a geographical point of view, one would expect that Cochinchinese
trade links with Southeast Asian countries/ports would be strongest with
Tongking, Cambodia, Laos and Siam since they are the closest to
Cochinchina. Nola Cooke has noted that by the 1670s the Nguyen rulers
had severely restricted trade with Tongking. See Nola Cooke, "Commerce
and Catastrophe: Cochinchina, Cambodia, and the Chinese in Modern
Southern Vietnam During the Later Nguyen Lord's Era (c. 1680-1770),"
unpublished MS, p. 12. Cooke also suggests that the Nguyen rulers by the
1670s did not allow their subjects to leave the kingdom without permis-
sion, a rule which limited trade to well-connected Cochinchinese (pp.12-
13). A Vietnamese text dated 1810 lists six different routes to Siam,
indicating the Vietnamese were quite Iamiliar with Siam by then. See
Geoff Wade, "A Maritime Route in the Vietnamese text 'Xiem-La-Qouc
Lo-Trinh Tap-Luc' (1810)," in Trade and Navigation in Southeast Asia,
pp.137-170, and Li Tana, "The 18 and Early 19" Century Mekong Delta
in the Regional Trade System," unpublished MS. Li Tana indicates that
trade with Manila began in 1620 and peaked in the 1660s, when four
Cochinchinese junks per year went there (Nguyen Cochinchina, p. 76,
citing P. Chaunu, Les Philippines et le Pacifiquedes Ibriques); trade with
Batavia was also regular during the middle 1600s (p. 76), but seemed to
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types of regional traders are readily identifiable; there was undoubtedly some mixing
between the three groups, especially groups two and three.
The first group is simply the traders from China who sailed annually to
the Nanyang from their bases in China, most likely Fujian. This group includes two
types: those whose primary destination was Hoi An, and those who simply stopped off
in Hoi An on their way to and from Southeast Asia. Recall how in 1567 the eastern and
western routes for Chinese ships were formalized, with approximately half the licensed
vessels going on the eastern route and the other half taking the western route. This
western route went right by the central coast of Vietnam, meaning that one-half of the
vessels licensed to trade in the Nanyang (not to mention the unlicenced vessels) had to
pass right by Hoi An. This is not to suggest that all these vessels did stop by, but simply
to suggest that Hoi An was within easy striking range on both the departing and return
trips, with no other major port in the immediate vicinity. Naturally, on the return trip
these vessels would be carrying trade goods, news and perhaps even passengers from
other Southeast Asian ports, thus maintaining regional connections.
The second, and perhaps biggest, group of regional traders were Chinese
traders based in the various ports of Southeast Asia. This group either targeted Hoi An
as their primary destination or stopped by Hoi An on their way to and from China and
(...continued)
tail off after the 1680s (see Souza, Survival of Empire, pp. 136 and 140,
noting that only five ships from Cochinchina - all Chinese - arrived in
Batavia from 1684-1754).
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Japan. Evidence for this can be found in the 1695 Bowyear account mentioned above;
Bowyear noted that it was the Chinese who drove the trade in Hoi An, and that the junks
from the various places listed - Japan, Siam, Cambodia, Manila and Batavia - were all
Chinese junks. Bowyear also highlighted the various goods the Chinese junks brought
to Hoi An from these other ports." Another bit of evidence for this type of Chinese
trader can be found in the records of junks from Southeast Asia arriving in Japan.
Chinese traders were crucial links in Japan's foreign trade, particularly from the 1640s
to the early 1700s, and many of these Chinese junks visiting Japan originated from
Southeast Asia (see Part V, Section B below). Yoneo Ishii has translated a number of
reports these Chinese Tosen vessels based in Southeast Asia made to Japanese authorities
from 1674 to 1723. A look through these reports indicates that virtually all the vessels
coming from Cambodia, Siam, Batavia and other areas passed by Cochinchina on their
way to Japan, and a number of these ships actually stopped in Hoi An."
In addition, Chinese immigration to Southeast Asia, as well as Chinese
shipping to Southeast Asia, increased rapidly after 1567, and until the late 1600s most
89 See Lamb, Mandarin Road to Old Hue, p. 52-3. Bowyear does not make
a distinction between Chinese junks originating from China and those
originating or based in Southeast Asian ports, but his description clearly
suggests that these junks were based in Southeast Asia. See also Souza
from previous note, indicating that the junks coming to Batavia from
Cochinchina were Chinese.
90 These reports also indicate that communication between Cambodia and
Cochinchina was common. Unfortunately, none of the reports from
Cochinchina to Japan are translated. See Yoneo Ishii, The Junk Trade
from Southeast Asia: Translations from the Tosen Fusetsu-gaki, 1674-
1723 (Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), especially
pps. 69, 88, 131, 155, 165, 182-3,197,and 225.
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of these immigrants were involved in trade. Large, extensive Chinese trading networks
formed across Southeast Asia with Manila (1570s-1640s), Batavia (1690s-1740) and
Siam (post 1740) serving as the centers of the junk trade. There were numerous other,
smaller ports in Southeast Asia which featured Chinese traders such as PnomPenh, Ligor
(Nakon Sithammarat), Pattani, Banten, Johor and ports along the north Java coast. As
the reports translated by Ishii suggest, this network of Chinese traders, many based in
Southeast Asia, undoubtedly functioned, inter alia, to maintain links between various
parts of Southeast Asia. As we will see in Part V below, after the first half of the 17
century the Chinese were the dominant traders in Hoi An, and Hoi An was certainly a
part of this larger network of Chinese traders in Southeast Asia.
The third group of regional traders were the indigenous peoples
themselves - those from Vietnam 9', Siam92, Java, and Malaya93. However, with the
infusion of Chinese into Southeast Asia and the dominant role in trade that the Chinese
91 Li Tana notes the trade carried on by Cochinchinese in Manila, Batavia
and Siam (there were also a number of Cochinchinese living in Siam) as
well as the presence of small scale traders from Cochinchina; apparently
the Nguyen rulers also traded directly with Siam (Nguyen Cochinchina,
pp. 76-7).One of the reports translated by Ishii also indicates that a ship
coming from Thailand rescued a Cochinchinese vessel somewhere in the
Gulf of Siam in 1693 (Ishii, Junk Trade From Southeast Asia, p. 69).
While the Vietnamese certainly excelled for centuries at fishing and other
maritime activities along the Vietnamese coast, overall this international
trade was most likely quite small, especially long-distance trade.
92 For more on Siamese traders, and especially Siamese trade with China, see
Viraphol, Tribute and Profit, and Cushman, Fields From the Sea.
93 Javanese traders evidently died out in the 17' century, at least in the long
distance sphere, according to Reid. See Age of Commerce, pp.281-85. Or
did it? See discussion above.
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rapidly assumed, it is difficult to tell to what extent this group was purely indigenous and
to what extent it was made up of Chinese who assimilated into the local culture. For
example, Jennifer Cushman, in her analysis of Siamese trade from the last half of the 18
century to the first half ofthe 19 century, notes how most of the 'Siamese' traders were
in fact Chinese, including those traders who acted on behalf of the royal family. This
stemmed in large part from trade advantages China granted to Southeast Asian junks
which looked "Chinese," met Chinese ship specifications, and carried mostly Chinese
crew.' More importantly, the Chinese - whether 'pure' or somewhat 'mixed' with
Siamese - had come to dominate Siamese foreign trade by as early as the turn of the 17'
century.95 Another example of this 'fusion' phenomenon can be seen with respect to
Javanese shipping. Anthony Reid has recently noted the remarkable integration of
Chinese and Javanese traders and vessels which peaked before 1567, in effect suggesting
that the Javanese traders who disappeared by the end of the 17h century were mixed
Chinese-Javanese." Two patterns are suggested by the above. First, over the years, and
9 Cushman, Fields from the Sea, Chapters Two, Three and Five.
95 Viraphol, Tribute and Profit, p.23; Cushman puts it at the middle of the
18' century, Fields from the Sea, pp. 98-9.
96 See Anthony Reid, "The Rise and Fall of Sino-Javanese Shipping," in
Anthony Reid, Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia,
(Chiang Mai, Thailand, Silkworm Books, 1999). In discussing the hybrid
nature of the 'junk', Reid builds on earlier work by Pierre Manguin which
suggests that the typical junk found in Southeast Asian waters is actually a
cross between a Chinese vessel and a Southeast Asian vessel. See Pierre
Manguin, "The Southeast Asian Ship: An Historical Approach," Journal of
Southeast Asian Studies, Volume XI, No. 2 (1980), pp. 266-79, and "The
Vanishing Jong: Insular Southeast Asian Fleets in Trade and War (Fif-
teenth to Seventeenth Centuries), in Reid, ed., Southeast Asia in the Early
Modern Era.
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especially after 1567, the Chinese -- pure or mixed - came to dominate shipping in
Southeast Asia at the expense of indigenous shippers. Second, this dominance was more
pronounced in long distance trade and shipping, thus pushing indigenous traders into
local - short distance - trade and shipping.
Hoi An was uniquely positioned to take advantage of the rapid increase
in international trade which began in the second half of the 16' century. Hoi An's
strategic location along the trade route to China would, to a large extent, link its success
directly or indirectly to the Chinese economy. Boosted initially by acting as a neutral
trading station for the China-Japan trade, Hoi An in its early years was heavily influenced
by both the Japanese and Chinese. The Portuguese and Dutch were also visible in the
city as a result of their trading activities in Asia. As the 1600s wore on and Japan
withdrew internationally, the Chinese became the most influential of all the foreign
elements in Hoi An, reflecting the growing Chinese trade and influence throughout
Southeast Asia. It has been suggested that the trade boom ended in the middle of the
1600s and did not pick up again until the middle ofthe 1700s, with the period in between
one of crisis insofar as trade is concerned. 97 As we will see in Part V, although no
comprehensive and reliable statistics are available, Hoi An's experience would seem to
buck this pattern, as it seemingly continued to prosper throughout the period; the reason
97 Reid, Age of Commerce, Chapters One and Five; and Reid, "Flows and
Seepages," pp. 42-8.
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for Hoi An's continued prosperity likely relates to the increasing presence ofthe Chinese
in the town after 1650 and the business activity they brought and fostered. Indeed, trade
in Hoi An would peak in the 1750s, then dwindle to a virtual halt by the 1770s, just as
trade in the rest of Southeast Asia was picking up again.
PART III. A DAY IN HOI AN.
One can imagine the scene a foreign visitor to Hoi An in its golden age
might see. Let's assume our visitor friend arrived during the trading season when Hoi
An was most active. The trading season was determined by the monsoons; the winds
from the northeast which brought Chinese and Japanese traders south to Hoi An
generally blew in the beginning of the year from January to March/April; these ships
would stay in port for several months until the winds from the southeast began blowing
in June and July, at which time ships heading north would return home. Thus the primary
trading season was in the first half of the year, and during this time the Hoi An harbor
was teeming with ships from various countries, creating a fair-like atmosphere.
Depending on the year, our visitor might see anywhere from 12 to 50 ships in the harbor,
which may include Japanese ships, one or two Portuguese carracks or galliots, a large
VOC trading ship, and perhaps even an English vessel. He would almost certainly be
guaranteed the sight of numerous Chinese junks, as well as junks from various parts of
Southeast Asia. There would also be a host of smaller craft in the water, such as prahus
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and sampans, bringing goods from upriver waterways (an important means of
transporting goods from the interior to Hoi An and from Hoi An to the interior) or plying
back and forth between the larger ships and the shore.
If our visitor were lucky enough, he might be treated to the arrival of one
of the big foreign trading ships. Depending on the size of the vessel, it may be towed part
of the way up the river to Hoi An, which lies just a few kilometers from the South China
Sea. After mooring across the river with the other ships, the captain or ship's
representative would come ashore and present himself to the customs officials, perhaps -
in the case of European vessels - bargaining for the price of the trade permit.98 The next
day the ship would be unloaded, either alongside the quay or by transferring cargo to
smaller vessels. The cargo would be presented in one of the three customs houses,
located next to each other in a compound approximately 100 yards wide. The middle
customs house - the largest- was flanked by the two smaller house and would be filled
with Vietnamese mandarins and customs officials, some ofwhom were Chinese. Soldiers
would be standing guard watching coolies (perhaps slaves/debt bondsmen from the
upland areas) bring the goods from the ship to the customs area. The goods would be
carefully examined and puzzled over by the inspectors to ensure appropriate duties were
paid and that goods presentable to the King would be set aside. Once cleared through
customs, the buying and trading would begin."
98 See Mantienne, "Indochinese Societies and European Traders," pp. 114-5,
and Kirsop, "Some Account of Cochinchina," p. 242.
99 The description of custom houses and procedures can be found in
(continued...)
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What goods might our visitor see being bought and sold? From Japan, the
primary goods were silver and copper (raw or in specie). From China, our visitor might
see raw silk, a multitude of silk fabrics, other types of cloth, blue porcelain and
chinaware, tutenag, white copper, copper, paper, tea, medicinal herbs and drugs, incense,
clothing, shoes, writing brushes and ink sticks, needles, tables and chairs, and
copperware.Y'Goods from Cochinchina itselfincluded gold, calambac, eaglewood, other
precious woods such as rosewood, ironwood and sappanwood, raw silk, various types
of sugar (cane, white, brown), pepper, cotton, cinnamon, birdnests, ivory, areca and betel
nut, indigo, cardamon, rhino horn, deer antlers, and various sea products such as sharks
fin, shrimp and snail heads. 'O Goods found in Hoi An from other parts of Southeast Asia
(...continued)
Bowyear's 1695 account. See Lamb, Mandarin Road to Old Hue, pp.47-8.
100 These products were noted by either Bowyear in 1695 (see Lamb, Manda-
rin Road to Old Hue, p. 52), Poivre in 1750 (see "Description of
Cochinchina,"in Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents on
Economic History, p. 86), Kirsop in 1750 (see "Some Account of
Cochinchina," pp. 244-5) or Le Quy Don in the mid 1770s (see "Miscella-
neous Nguyen Records," Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents
on Economic History, pp. 117, 120).
101 These products were noted by either Borri in the 1620s (see Cochinchina
in Pinkerton, A General Collection of the Best and Most Interesting
Voyages, pp.778-80), the Japanese Francisco in 1642 (see "A Japanese
Resident's Account," in Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents
on Economic History, p. 28), Bowyear in 1695 (see Lamb, Mandarin
Road to Old Hue, p. 53), Poivre in 1750 (see "Description of
Cochinchina,"in Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents on
Economic History, p. 86, 93), Kirsop in 1750 (see "Some Account of
Cochin China,", pp. 245-8) or Le Quy Don in the mid 1770s (see "Miscel-
laneous Nguyen Records," Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen: Docu-
ments on Economic History, pp. 117). The main products seem to have
been gold, calambac and eaglewood, and then perhaps silk, sugar (which
began to be exported in the 1620s, Nguyen Cochinchina, p. 80) and other
(continued...)
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included saltpeter, sappanwood, lac, mother of pearl, elephants teeth, tin, rice (from
Siam), gamboge (a gum), benzoin, cardamon, wax, sappanwood, buffalo hides, deer
skins, elephants teeth, rhino horns (from Cambodia), silver, sandalwood, saltpeter, cotton
cloth, vermillion (Batavia), and silver, brimstone, sappanwood, cowries, tobacco, and
wax (Manila).102
Where were these goods destined? The main Japanese import, of course,
was Chinese silk, but the Japanese also imported porcelain from China, silks, sugars,
calambac, pepper, various woods, deerskins, and gold from Cochinchina, and numerous
products - mostly animal skins (especially deerskins), horns, and pepper from other parts
of Southeast Asia. 0 3 The Chinese products listed in the previous paragraph were
101 (...continued)
products, though there is no way to assess with any specificity the impor-
tance of any one product. Tome Pires as far back as the early 16* century
noted that Champa (presumably central Vietnam) was known mostly for
its calambac and to a lesser extent gold; Cochinchina (presumably he was
referring to Tonkin, as he mentions silver, which is not found in Central
Vietnam) was known for its gold, silver, silk and calambac. See The Suma
Oriental of Tome Pires: An Account of the East, From the Red Sea to
Japan. Written in Malacca and India in 1512-1515, and the Book of
Francisco Rodrigues, (Reprinted in New Delhi, India, Asian Educational
Services, 1990), Volume I, pp.12-15. The Dutch were buying pepper in
Cochinchina as early as 1602 - see "The Trials of a Foreign Merchant,
Letter by Jeronimus Wonderaer from Hoi An, 1602," in Southern Vietnam
under the Nguyen: Documents on Economic History, pp. 6-26.
102 Cited in 1695 by Bowyear. See Lamb, Mandarin Road to Old Hue, p. 53.
103 See Innes, Door Ajar, pp. 64-6; Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, p. 66
(citing Seiichi). Japan was apparently the primary overseas destination for
the sugar grown in Cochinchina. See Innes, Door Ajar, pp. 504-18, and
David Bulbeck, Anthony Reid, Lay Cheng Tan and Yiqi Wu, compilers,
Southeast Asian Exports Since the 14 ' Century: Cloves, Pepper, Coffee
(continued...)
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destined not only for Cochinchina but also for other parts of Southeast Asia (with Hoi
An serving as a regional emporium for Southeast Asia). The Chinese imported virtually
all of the products from Cochinchina and other parts of Southeast Asia listed in the
previous paragraph.' 04 As Hoi An served as a regional entrepot, we can also speculate
that a number of goods from one Southeast Asian port - say Manila - ended up in another
Southeast Asian country such as Cambodia. These exchanges would be effected through
either barter - goods for goods- or in bullion or cash (silver and copper).
If our visitor could tear himself away from the sights of the harbor and
walk down the main street which paralleled the river, he might walk through the bustling
market in which local women, teeth stained red from betel nut, sold all types of
vegetables, fruits and fish. He might sit at the market for a while and chew betel nut with
the local traders; betel nut was often used in social occasions. 10 5 At one end of the main
street he would come across the Japanese bridge; towards the other end he would find
the Chinese and Japanese sections of town and the Japanese street. These sections of
town, marked by brick houses and roads, would have been very different than other parts
103 (...continued)
and Sugar (Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), pp.
107-117.
104 See Poivre's 1750 account ("Description of Cochinchina,"in Southern
Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents on Economic History, p. 86) and
Le Quy Don's report from the mid 1770s ("Miscellaneous Nguyen Re-
cords," Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents on Economic
History, p. 117).
105 See Borri, Cochinchina, in Pinkerton, A General Collection of the Best
and Most Interesting Voyages, p. 777.
62
of town, as most Cochinchinese and other local peoples lived in stilt houses. He might
step into the Dutch trading factory or Japanese trading houses or hotels to check out the
goods in storage; hotels were often rented out by the Portuguese and Japanese, with the
front part used to conduct transactions and the back part used for sleeping and storage."
He might also peek into one of the many Chinese temples and assembly halls. He would
likely run into numerous Chinese traders as well as Japanese and Portuguese residents
of the city. He might catch an occasional glimpse of a Vietnamese mandarin with
blackened teeth and long fingernails (a status symbol indicating that one did not work
with his hands) or a Jesuit missionary, and he would probably see Chams and other
minority groups and even some slaves from the uplands. Most of these people would be
dressed in their distinctive garb and speaking their own language. If the visitor really had
time on his hands, he could even visit some of the Japanese and Chinese graves scattered
about the city.
PART V. HOI AN'S GOLDEN AGE: 1600 TO THE 1770s.
The description of Hoi An in Part IV, with a few changes here and there,
could be appropriate for almost any year during the period 1600 to 1775, Hoi An's
golden age. In this section, we take a closer look at Hoi An's golden years, dividing the
era into three parts: the period from 1600 through the 1640s, the period from the 1650s
106 See Do Bang, "The Relations and Pattern of Trade between Hoi An and
the Inland," in Ancient Town of Hoi An, pp. 149-158, p. 153.
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through the 1720s, and the period from about 1730 through the 1770s. For each of these
three periods, trade cycles, population estimates and descriptions of the city and its
buildings and streets will be discussed. Unfortunately for the modern historian,
apparently no population or shipping records kept by the local government have survived
to the present. Consequently, in tracing the development of the city one is forced to rely
almost entirely on accounts of the many foreign visitors to the area. Trade records
maintained by the Japanese and various European trading companies are also very
helpful, but there are no reliable and comprehensive records for Chinese trade activity,
overall the biggest contributor to Hoi An's growth.
Before discussing the 1600-1650 period, brief mention should be made
of Hoi An prior to 1600. Long before the Vietnamese began arriving in large numbers
to the south in the late 1500s, Hoi An was part of the great Chain kingdom, one of the
classic Indianized kingdoms of Southeast Asia. It is likely that the Chain capital of Tra
Kieu (5' to 10 centuries) was located in the Thu Bon river system in the Hoi An area,
and the capital city or another town in the Hoi An area served as one of the major Chain
trading ports during this period. My-Son, one of the centers of Chain civilization, is
located just a short distance from Hoi An, and many vestiges of Chain architecture and
civilization have also been found in and around Hoi An. Little is known about the area
after the Chain capital was forced south to Vijaya (modern Binh Dinh) in the 10*
century, but nevertheless the Hoi An area was no stranger to international trade when
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Nguyen Hoang and his followers arrived in the area in the second half of the 1500s."107
In the second half of the 16' century, Hoi An seemed to awaken from its
slumber and once again play a major role in trade. Recall that the Vietnamese annals in
discussing the last half ofthe 16'b century mention the abundant trade and the seaborne
merchants who flocked to a city which was certainly Hoi An. Hoi An undoubtedly
received a boost from the growing trade of the'Age of Commerce', especially after 1567
when private Chinese commercial trade was authorized. We can speculate with a fair
degree of certainty that there was a Chinese trading community in Hoi An by the last few
decades of the 16' century. As we have also seen, the Portuguese began trading in Hoi
An as early as the 1540s and certainly by the late 1550s, and there were already a few
Portuguese resident in the town by the mid-1580s. Similarly, the Japanese were already
trading, and perhaps resident, in Hoi An by the 1580s/early 1590s.
In spite of this abundance of trade and contact with the outside world
before 1600, the year 1600 has been chosen as our starting point for the simple reason
that 1600 was the year in which Nguyen Hoang gave up his quest for the throne in the
107 Charles Wheeler has written a good account of the Cham kingdom and its
relationship to the area where Hoi An is located. See Wheeler, Cross-
Cultural trade and Trans-Regional Networks, especially Chapter Two.
See also Kenneth Hall, Maritime Trade and State Development in Early
Southeast Asia (Honolulu, Hawaii, University of Hawaii Press, 1985),
Chapter Seven; Phan Huy Le, "Hoi An (Faifo) Past and Present," in
Ancient Town of Hoi An, pp.1 7-22; and Tran Ky Phuong and Vu Huu
Minh, ""Cua Dai Chiem (Port of Great Champa) in the 4th-15th Centu-
ries," in Ancient Town of Hoi An, pp.77-81. See also Part VI, Section A
below.
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north and returned permanently to central Vietnam to concentrate on building his rule
there.
A. 1600 to 1650: Dynamism and Diversity.
The period from 1600 to approximately 1650 was perhaps the most
dynamic in Hoi An's history. Hoi An was in the middle of the lucrative Chinese silk-
Japanese silver trade. There were established presences of both Japanese and Chinese
in the city, and there was regular trade with both Japan and China. Portuguese vessels
from Macao were regular visitors, as were the Dutch, who established and then closed
two trading factories. Even as the influential Japanese population began to shrink by the
end of the period, the Chinese population was rising as evidenced by the establishment
of the ming-huong-xa (Ming village) in the late 1640s/early 1650s.
Perhaps the most famous account of Hoi An in this period was that of the
Italian Jesuit Cristoforo Borri, who stayed in Cochinchina from 1618 to 1621. We have
already highlighted some of Borr's comments on the trade scene in Cochinchina. In
describing Hoi An itself, Borri further notes how
"The Chinefe and the Japanefe drive the chief trade of Cochin-China,
which is managed at a fair held yearly at one of the ports of this kingdom,
and laing about four months. The Chinefe, in their vessels they call
junks, bring the value of four or five millions in plate; and the Japanefe in
their ships called fommes, an infinite quantity of very fine silk, and some
other commodities of their country. The King has a vail revenue from
this fair by culomes and impofts, and the whole country receives great
profit....[t]he principal port to which all ftrangers report, and where the
above mentioned fair is kept, is that of the province Cacchian; which has
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two mouths from the fea, the one called Pulluchiampello and the other of
Turon, being at firft three or four leagues diftant from one another, but
running in seven or eight leagues like two great rivers, at laft join in one,
where the veffels that come in both ways meet. Here the King of Cochin-
china affigned the Chinefe and the Japanefe a convenient fpot of ground
to build a city for the benefit of the fair. This city is called Faifo, and is
fo large, that we may fay there are two, one of Chinefe, the other of
Japanefe; for they are divided from one another, each having their diftinct
governor, and the Chinefe living according to the laws of China, as the
Japanefe do according to thofe of Japan."'1 0
Borri goes on to note the use of silver and coins with holes in the middle (presumably
Chinese) as mediums of exchange.
Alexander de Rhodes, another Jesuit missionary and the person generally
credited with establishing quoc ngu - the modern form of written Vietnamese - lived in
Cochinchina in 1625-26 and then off and on from 1640 to 1645, some of the time in Hoi
An. Interestingly, Rhodes' account ofhis stay in Cochinchina indicates that missionaries
were already occasionally banned from Cochinchina (as well as persecuted), and he had
to be circumspect in his proselytizing, often able to preach at night only. He was
sentenced to death in 1644 (he was held prisoner for 22 days in Hoi An, a place which
he found "very convenient for Christians") but his execution was commuted and he was
banished from Cochinchina in 1645. Rhodes described Faifo as a town "where much
108 See Borri's Cochinchina, in Pinkerton, A General Description of the Best
and Most Interesting Voyages, pp. 795-6. It is hard to tell from the lan-
guage, but Borri may have confused the Chinese and Japanese - it was the
Chinese who brought silk and the Japanese who brought silver. Borri also
refers to two entrances to Hoi An; one was by the Thu Bon river, which
empties directly into the South China Sea, and the other was an inland
waterway from Turon (modern-day Danang), some 25-30 kilometers north
of Hoi An. The Danang-Hoi An waterway silted up in the 19* century.
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trading is done by the Japanese, who have their headquarters and carry on their business
there." The Japanese residents had their own Japanese governor, whom Rhodes claimed
to have converted promptly. Rhodes noted the presence in Hoi An of Portugese from
Macao. He also described Cham province - likely the province encompassing Hoi An -
as the site of heaviest trade with the Portugese, Chinese and Japanese, where "anything
you want can be marketed." At another point in his narrative, he referred to Faifo as "a
Japanese town" and noted that several local women had married Japanese Christians. 109
Yet another description of Cochinchina and Hoi An is available from a
Japanese named Francisco (whom we have also encountered previously) who lived in
Cochinchina for 10 years, most likely in Hoi An. Dated 1642 and prepared for use in a
Dutch report, the account indicates that there were "40 to 50 Japanese in Faifo, none in
the service ofthe king....[a]pproximately four to five thousand or more indolent Chinese,
none in the king's service, reside in this country; these Chinese do not pay tribute which
is the reason they stay here...." The account notes that 10 to 12 Portuguese come to
Cochinchina each year and leave at the beginning of June (these were obviously traders
in for the trade season who most likely stayed in Hoi An). The account goes on to
describe the type of merchandise available in the country, and notes cannon from both
109 See Rhodes of Vietnam: The Travels and Missions of Father Alexander de
Rhodes in china and other Kingdoms of the Orient, translated by Solange
Hertz (Westminister, Maryland, The Newmann Press, 1966). The descrip-
tions of Hoi An and quoted sections are found on pp. 80-2, 86, 163, and
172-3.
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the Dutch and Portuguese. The Thu Bon River on which Hoi An is situated is also
described in some detail."0
Another account, this one by William Verstegen, the head of the Dutch
mission sent in 1651 to establish commercial relations, reported that there "are few
streets in Pheij-pho; both sides of the main street which is running along the river, are
flanked by fire-proof masonry houses. These houses are occupied by Chinese merchants
and craftsman, except for the sixty or so which are occupied by the Japanese. Few
Cochinchinese are seen in this city.""'
These accounts indicate the presence of substantial communities of
Japanese and Chinese living in Hoi An in the first half of the 1600s. There was enough
of a population for each group to have its own quarter in town and to be the dominant
players inthe economy. Interestingly, each group had its own governor, who presumably
kept the community in line and liaised with Vietnamese officials. Most accounts and
commentary note that intermarriage between local women and Japanese and Chinese was
common. Innes estimates the number of Japanese living in Hoi An (presumably before
1635) at around 300.112 The drop-off to approximately 40-60 by the early 1640s
described in Francisco and Verstegen's accounts is consistent with the 1635 Japanese ban
110 See "A Japanese Resident's Account," in Southern Vietnam under the
Nguyen: Documents on Economic History, pp.27-32.
"11 Cited in Chen, Historical Notes on Hoi An, p. 15.
112 Innes, Door Ajar, p. 62 (citing Japanese sources).
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on overseas travel. Yet despite the 1635 ban, the Rhodes account (1640-5) suggests that
the Japanese were still very influential in Hoi An. Unfortunately, there are no precise
numbers for the Chinese population. The Japanese resident's account described above
noted that there were four to five thousand Chinese in the country; it would certainly be
reasonable to assume that at least half of these Chinese were living in Hoi An, Hue being
the only other center of Chinese population. If so, that would suggest that in terms of
numbers, the Chinese population ofHoi An (say 2,500) dwarfed the Japanese population,
even at the height of the Japanese population.
In spite of the large numerical superiority of the Chinese, the Japanese
were very influential in the city as reflected in the various visitor accounts. The Japanese
were influential enough to have cornered the silk market by the 1630s; the pricing of silk
was at times determined by the movement of shuin-sen and the Dutch were often unable
to buy silk as a result of Japanese control."3 Perhaps this influence can be traced to the
relative importance of Hoi An as a port to the Japanese (25% of the red seal trade from
1604-35); because HoiAn was so crucialto their trade, the Japanese presence in Hoi An
may have been much more organized and deliberate than it otherwise would have been.
As we have seen, Hoi An was not nearly so important to the Chinese trade as it was to
the Japanese trade, and the Chinese government in Beijing overall paid little attention to
foreign trade, letting traders fend for themselves. Consequently the Chinese presence in
Hoi Anwas more individual-oriented and less organized and deliberate than the Japanese
113 Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, pp. 63 and 73.
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presence. In any case, the general trend is one of decreasing Japanese influence by the
end of the 1640s and increasing Chinese influence.
The presence of the Portuguese and Dutch added to the multicultural
mix. Recall that the Dutch twice established trading factories in Hoi An (1636-1641,
and 1651-4), short-lived as they were, and were frequent visitors until the early 1650s.
The accounts above also suggest that the Portuguese were frequent visitors, and we
have already seen that there were several resident Portuguese. The European impact was
increased also by the Jesuit presence, scattered as it was. Added to this mix were the
traders - likely mostly Chinese but perhaps also indigenous traders - from other places
in Southeast Asia.
Virtually all of the above accounts portray Hoi An as a thriving place of
commerce open to practically any country. The Japanese were probably at the head of
the pack of foreign traders before 1636, as Hoi An was the single most important port
for the red seal trade. We saw in Part III that in the period from 1604 to 1635, 87
Japanese ships were licensed to trade in Hoi An, an average of three per year (and on top
of this there was in all likelihood a number of unlicenced Japanese ships as well). Due
to the Japanese ban on travel after 1635, the number of Japanese ships arriving in Hoi
An thereafter shrank to almost nothing. The number of Chinese vessels visiting Hoi An
during this time is unknown, but we know that out of 88 ships licensed to travel in the
Nanyang in 1589, four ships per year were authorized to trade in Hoi An, a number that
likely rose as the number of licensed ships reached 137 by the end of the 1590s. Added
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to this were the Chinese vessels trading along the western route which stopped by Hoi
An, as well as a number of unauthorized vessels (number undeterminable). A conserva-
tive estimate of Chinese vessels would be five per year; the number may have been as
high as 10-12, and certainly varied from year to year.'1 4  With respect to European
vessels, we saw in Part III above how the Portuguese arrivals in Hoi An averaged one
to two vessels per year for most of the 17' and 18' centuries, and how the Dutch were
most active in Hoi An during the first half of the 17' century; therefore we can estimate
that together the Portuguese and Dutch vessels during the first half of the 17' century
probably averaged two to three per year. Added to these numbers were vessels from
Southeast Asia (including Chinese vessels based in Southeast Asia); again, no precise
numbers are available, but we can reasonably estimate three to four per year (perhaps
one each from Siam and Cambodia, and two from the island world).
In summing up the ship traffic for this period, one may conservatively
estimate that from 13 to 21 foreign ships visited Hoi An each year during this period
(three Japanese, five to ten Chinese, two to three European, three to four Southeast
Asian). 13 per year is extremely conservative; it would not be surprising to find that the
actual average was twice that. In addition, there was probably wide variance from year
to year.
114 Reid, citing Chinese sources, says eight ships a year came (see Anthony
Reid, "Economic and Social Change. c. 1400-1800," in Cambridge His-
tory of Southeast Asia, p. 467. Tsao claims that 17 Chinese ships were
scheduled to come to Hoi An in 1622 and four in 1626, and five came in
1631 (see Tsao, "Chinese Overseas Trade," p. 444, citing various Dutch
reports).
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From the accounts described above, we can also get a sense of the layout
of Hoi An. From the Verstegen report, we know that Hoi An's main street paralleled the
river, which makes perfect sense given the role of water-based trade in Hoi An.
Verstegen also notes that the main street was lined with "fire-proof masonry houses"
occupied by Chinese merchants and Japanese. Presumably these houses were
constructed from some sort of brick. These types of houses would naturally be occupied
by Chinese, Japanese and other foreigners as the typical non-sinicized Southeast Asian
usually lived in a house on stilts. There were likely a few of these stilt houses around
also. Borri in his accounts notes that both the Chinese and Japanese had their own
sections or quarters in the city. The location of these quarters, however, is debated."
(One wonders also how the Borri and Verstegen accounts square up: were the separate
Japanese and Chinese quarters Borri described located along Verstegen's main street?)
Ogura Sadao has argued that ancient Japanese scrolls dating from the period indicate
there was also a Japanese street in Hoi An, which probably was what Borri meant by a
Japanese section."'
There are numerous buildings and other physical markers fromthis period
which still exist today. For example, the famous wooden Japanese Bridge (though
obviously not the original) is a clear indication of the Japanese presence and dates from
around 1650. There is also an extant stone steele with Japanese characters found in a
"1 Chen, Historical Notes on Hoi An, pp. 17-18.
116 Ogura Sadao, "About Two Japanese Scrolls," in Ancient Town of Hoi An,
pp.128-34.
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cave near Hoi An which dates to around 1640 and suggests that Japanese ships continued
to come to Hoi An after 1635. There are also two Japanese tombs dating from this
period. Two Chinese temples - the Cam-Ha temple and the Hai-Binh temple - were
constructed next to each other around 1626. The gate from the Hai-Binh temple, now
known as Ba Mu temple, is still extant. 117
B. 1650 to the 1720s: The Chinese Take Over.
The period from 1650 to about 1730 in Hoi An was marked by the
ascendancy of the Chinese, which more than made up for the diminished presence of the
Japanese. As we saw in Part III, the fall of the Ming Dynasty in China in 1644 triggered
a mass exodus of Chinese from the homeland to the southern seas. So great was this
migration that sometime in the late 1640s or early 1650s the minh-huong-xa or Ming
village was established in Hoi An. Most of these Chinese were from the southern coastal
areas such as Fujian, Zhejiang or Guangdong and were in some manner involved with
trade."' The Chinese of the Ming village were allowed to maintain their own customs
and traditions and were not forced to assimilate with the local population, though there
surely was some integration."' The establishment of the Ming village was testified to by
the construction of two Chinese temples, the Quan-Thanh temple (also known as Chua
"1 Chen, Historical Notes on Hoi An, pp. 62-3, 71, and 93-4; Vu Minh
Giang, "The Japanese Presence in Hoi An," in Ancient Town of Hoi An, p.
136.
118 Chen, Historical Notes on Hoi An, Chapter Three.
119 See Nguyen Hoi Chan, "Some Aspects of the Chinese Community," p.1 1 8.
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Ong) and the Quan Am temple (devoted to the Buddhist goddess of mercy). A framed
wooden tablet with Chinese characters found at the Quan-Thanh temple actually refers
to minh-huong-xa and is dated 1653; a stone inscription found at the Quan-Than temple
and dating from 1753 says both temples were established over 100 years previously. The
Quan Am temple is likely the place where the Chinese monk Da Shan stayed in 1695 (see
Section B below).120 These temples, built side by side, can still be visited today.
The increased presence of the Chinese in Hoi An led to the involvement
of a number of Chinese in local government matters. We have already seen in the Borri
account how even inthe period 1600-1650 the Chinese had their own governor and were
self-governing; Chinese participation in government seems to have expanded beyond this
governor position in the second part of the 1600s. For example, the epitaph of one
Khong Thien-Nu dated 1695 indicates that he was "in charge of commanding various
countries' vessels and supervising newly arrived as well as residing Chinese merchants..."
The position mentioned on the epitaph was that of cai-phu-tau, a high ranking staff
position within the government bureau responsible for customs, trade and immigration
which was often held by Chinese from the Ming village or Chinese merchants residing
in Hoi An. The inscription of another Chinese, Chau Ky Son, dated 1694, indicates that
he held the position of not only cai-phu-tau but also no vien, or advisor/counselor to
the Nguyen rulers; this position was apparently granted to Chinese who were closely
related economically to the Nguyen. Yet a third epitaph, this one dating from 1691,
indicates that the deceased held the position of cai-phu itself, a post presumably higher
120 Chen, Historical Notes on Hoi An, pp.40-2, 59-62, 78-9.
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than cai-phu-tau.121 In addition to these official positions, Chinese - and Japanese-
merchants also acted in unofficial capacities for the Nguyen by conveying correspon-
dence from the Nguyen to Japan and to ports in Southeast Asia.'
The two primary foreign accounts of Hoi An during this period both
come from 1695-6. The first is that of Thomas Bowyear, the Englishman we
encountered earlier who headed a mission in 1695-6 from the British East India
Company to establish commercial relations with Cochinchina. Bowyear's report, dated
April 30,1696, was actually written from Hoi An. Bowyear described Hoi An as follows:
"This Foy Foe is about three leagues from the bar, a street by the river
side with two rows of houses to the number of 100 or thereabouts
inhabited by the Chinese, except for four or five families of Japanners
who, formerly, were the chief inhabiters and ruled the trade of this port;
but they being diminished and impoverished, the trade is now driven by
the Chinese, with ten or twelve junks yearly at least, viz. from Japan,
Canton, Siam, Camboya, Manilha, and of late from Batavia. The Jappan
junks are not constant, nor do they return directly since the prohibition
of the exportation of silver by the Emperor of Jappan; but dispose their
Jappan cargo in China and bring other goods with such a quantity of
copper as sufficeth the market...."123
The account also notes, somewhat surprisingly, that the "Jappaners" were still active in
trade, particularly trade involving gold.' 2 4
121 Ibid, pp. 47-8, 121, 123.
12 Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, p. 71.
123 See Lamb, Mandarin Road to Old Hue, pp. 52-3.
124 Ibid, p. 51.
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Several things are of interest from the above account. First is the number
of Chinese junks - at least 10 to 12 - which visited Hoi An each year. Second, the efforts
by Japan to limit the export of silver and specie were having an impact. It is also
interesting how the junks went from Japan to China and brought back copper - reflective
of the increasing need for copper and specie in Cochinchina after Japan began limiting
its exports. Third is the suggestion of the Japanese and Chinese populations. The
Japanese, the former "chief inhabiters" and "rulers of trade," had seen their population
shrink to four to five families. Surprisingly, there were only 95 or so Chinese families;
there were surely more than that, and one explanation may be that these numbers (both
Japanese and Chinese) were limited to those who lived on the main street. (Another note
of interest, already discussed in Part III, is the origin of those vessels - Japan, Canton,
Siam, Cambodia, Manila and Batavia.)
The second account is from the Chinese monk Da Shan who also visited
Cochinchina in 1695. Da Shan was apparently invited to Cochinchina by the Nguyen
ruler to teach Buddhism, although his real motives may have reached beyond this.12' Da
Shan described Hoi An as follows:
"Hoi An is a big sea port, a meeting place for merchants from many
countries. The main road, three to four leagues long [1.5 to 2 kilome-
ters], runs along the bank of the river; it is bordered on both sides by
125 Li Tana says Da Shan was there to teach Buddhism (see Southern Vietnam
under the Nguyen: Documents on Economic History, p. 55). Charles
Wheeler suggests his reasons for coming may have been economic as well;
see Charles Wheeler, "Patterns of association in the Haiwai Jishi: Trans-
Regional Perspectives on Seventeenth Century Dang Trong,", unpublished
MS presented at the 2001 Conference of the American Historical associa-
tion, January 5, 2001.
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closely built houses inhabited by people who came from Fujian. They
wear the clothing of the previous dynasty [the Ming Dynasty, 1368-
1644]. Most of the women take care of the commercial dealings.
Chinese residents generally married many local women in order to
facilitate their negotiations. The street ends at the Japanese bridge, in
other words Cam Pho; on the other bank, at Tra Nhieu, foreign vessels
[are] moored. The population density is very high; all day, people buy and
sell vegetables, fish, fruits, and shell-fish. Here, one can find medications
which do not exist in the capital, Thuan Hoa. The city is close to the sea
on three sides - to the east, south and north; to the west, a mountainous
region, a road links Tay Viet (western Vietnam) to Dong Kinh (Tonkin);
a type of garrison to defend against foreigners is about ten leagues from
the city...."126
The existence of the foreign merchants from many countries, the bustling
market where one can obtain drugs that could not be obtained in the capital, and the
population density all convey the feeling of a thriving port, similar to Borri's description
some 70 years earlier and Bowyear's description the same year. Interestingly, in contrast
to Bowyear's narrative, there is no mention of Japanese residents in Da Shan's account.
The positioning of the garrison is also interesting; it is not located in town, which might
have intimidated foreign traders, but it is not too far away either in case trouble should
flare up. The account also noted that there was a rice shortage and Hoi An had to import
rice from other districts.' 7
Both the above accounts also suggest that Hoi An was well on its way to
becoming a town dominated by the Chinese by the mid 1690s. Bowyear noted how the
126 Text taken from Nguyen Dinh Dau, "The Birth and Historic Evolution of
Hoi An," in Ancient Town of Hoi An, p. 118.
127 See "A Chinese Buddhist Report, 1694-5," in Southern Vietnam under the
Nguyen: Documents on Economic History, p. 58.
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Chinese were now the drivers of trade, having replaced the Japanese, and most of the
ships that came from Asia to Hoi An were Chinese. Da Shan's account also suggests that
the Chinese from Fujian who still wore the clothing of the Ming dynasty dominated the
town. We saw in Part III above how Chinese foreign trade and immigration to Southeast
Asia shot up after the recission of the trade ban in 1684, and thus it is not surprising to
find in Hoi An in the mid-1690s that the Chinese had come to dominate trade. This
phenomenon is also evidenced by the epitaphs of various Chinese we examined earlier -
those epitaphs, which indicate high government positions in matters of trade, also date
from the early to mid 1690s. There are numerous other Chinese tombs from the 1680s
and 1690s, still extant today, which also attest to the growing Chinese presence.128 The
Bowyear account suggests that the Japanese still retained a small presence by the end of
the century; another indication of the Japanese presence earlier in the period is the
construction in 1670 of a Japanese temple (Matsumoto Dera) in Hoi An by a resident
Japanese merchant."2 Yet the Chinese presence in Hoi An, fueled by the overthrow of
the Ming dynasty in 1644 and then by the opening up of shipping in the early 1680s,
seemed to continue to grow. The two assembly halls of Phuc Kien Hoi Quan (Assembly
Hall for the Fujianese, 1690s) and Trung Hoa Hoi Quan (Assembly Hall for Maritime
Commerce, c.1720) built during this time also attest to increased Chinese presence in
the 1690s and into the 18' century.130
128 Chen, Historical Notes on Hoi An, pp.122-5.
129 Ibid, pp. 16-7.
130 Ibid, pp. 63, 65, 68-70.
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As with the 1600-1650 period, shipping and trade figures are difficult to
determine. We know that Chinese junks based in Hoi An were fairly active in overseas
trade, as they stepped into the void in the Japan-China trade left by the withdrawal of
the Japanese and Portuguese vessels in the 1630s. Figures complied by Li Tana indicate
that a total of 636 Chinese junks visited Japan from ports in Southeast Asia from the
period 1650 to 1720; 202 or 32% of these came from Cochinchina (presumably all from
Hoi An). Siam was Hoi An's closest competitor with 138 or 22%, followed by
Cambodia with 105 or 17%, Batavia with 86 orl4% and Tongking with 56 or 9%.31
For Hoi An, this was an average of roughly three Chinese junks per year departing for
Japan. Li Tana's figures indicate that there was a significant decrease after 1700, which
one would expect given the Japanese policy changes beginning in the 1680s and
culminating in the almost complete shutdown in trade in the 1710s. If we subtract the
1700s from Li Tana's calculations, we find that 182 Chinese junks from Hoi An visited
Japan from 1650 to 1700, an average of 3.6 per year. Thus Hoi An remained closely
linked to the Japan-China throughout the second half ofthe 17 century and in to the 18"
century. This linkage undoubtedly was a significant contributor to Hoi An's status as an
entrepot, as it likely meant a continuing influx of vessels from both China and Southeast
Asia bringing goods to Hoi An to supply the Japanese market.
What about foreign vessels visiting Hoi An? The Manchu ban on Chinese
shipping from the mid 1660s to the early 1680s would have limited shipping to some
131 Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, p. 68, citing Japanese sources. Reid, in
Charting the Shape (p.95), cites similar, though not exact, figures.
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extent, although as we saw in Part III a number of vessels from the Cheng empire
continued to trade with Southeast Asia during this period. We also have seen how
Chinese trade in Southeast Asia took off in the mid 1680s, though again no figures are
available. The Bowyear report indicated that by the mid 1690s at least 10-12 Chinese
junks per year from various places came to Hoi An. Chen estimates that of those 10-12,
six to seven were directly from China (the others coming from Japan and Southeast
Asia), and citing reports from Chinese junks notes that in 1690 18 junks came from
China, in 1697 eight junks came from China, and in 1699 only three junks came from
China.'32
The trade picture for the first two decades or so of the 1700s is murky,
as there is neither sufficient trade data nor any foreign accounts of Hoi An. Whitmore
suggests that the "commercial situation of Hoi An appears to have suffered" in the first
three decades of the 1700s.'3 If so, part of the reason perhaps related to the drastic
decline in trade with Japan, especially after 1715; on the other hand, this may also have
meant an increase in Chinese vessels coming to Southeast Asia as an alternative to Japan.
Another contributing factor may have been the increase in duties in the late 1600s (see
132 Chen, Historical Notes on Hoi An, pp. 24-5 (citing Chinese and Vietnam-
ese sources).
133 Whitmore, "Vietnam and the Monetary Flow," pp. 384-5. However,
Cheong says Chinese trade with Cochinchina from 1715 to the 1740s
"remained unimpaired, having been spared prohibition in 1718. The gold it
brought attracted the interest of the Europeans in the 1720s and 1730s..."
W. E. Cheong, "The Age of Suqua, 1720-1759: the Early Hong Mer-
chants," in Karl Haellquist, ed., Asian Trade Routes, (London, England,
Curzon Press, Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies, 1991), pp. 217-
230, p. 225-6.
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Part II above). Yet a third may have been the Ching bans on Chinese trade and travel
from 1717-27; while Vietnam was excluded from these bans, a decrease in overall trade
would certainly have hurt Hoi An's standing as an entrepot as well as a stopover point
for Chinese vessels following the western route. Perhaps any decline Hoi An suffered was
also due simply to the overall decline in trade from the mid 1600s to the mid 1700s as
noted by Anthony Reid. However, until more information is unearthed, the trade picture
for the first quarter of the 18 century will remain unclear.
Given the overall lack of data, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions
regarding Hoi An's trade from the 1650s to the 1720s except in general patterns. Trade
likely suffered somewhat from 1650 to the early 1680s due to the Qing trade bans.
Trade with Japan, carried out by Chinese traders based in Hoi An, was robust, averaging
3.6 departures per year until 1700. Trade may have peaked in the early-to-mid 1690s;
there were anywhere from eight to 18 junks arriving from China, with perhaps five to
six per year from Southeast Asia. Aside from the Portuguese (one to two ships per year),
trade with the Europeans was minimal for the entire 75 year period. For the early-to-mid
1690s, we can estimate that from 14 to 24 foreign vessels visited Hoi An annually,
slightly higher than the 13 to 21 estimated for the period 1600-50. For the first quarter
of the 1700s, trade may have leveled off or simply declined; there is not enough
information to draw a firm conclusion.
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C. 1730 to the 1770s: Boom and Bust.
The period from the 1730s to the 1770s witnessed a surge in activity for
Hoi An as trade, fueled by the Chinese junk trade, reached its all-time zenith in the 1740s
and 1750s. The Chinese population of Hoi An continued to soar along with the trade;
by the 1740s, Hoi An was clearly a Chinese town. However, by the end of the period,
trade had declined for a variety of reasons, and the disruption and destruction caused by
the Tayson rebellion in the 1770s through the end of the century ensured that Hoi An
would never regain her former glory.
Chingho Chen cites three reasons for the pickup in trade beginning in the
1730s and its dominance by the Chinese.'' First, beginning in the early 1670s there was
peace between the Trinh in the north and Nguyen Cochinchina, a peace that was to last
until the mid 1770s when the Trinh again came south and took the Nguyen capital as the
Nguyen were distracted by the Tayson rebellion. This peaceful period meant that neither
side needed foreign assistance such as weapons provided by the Europeans and became
less tolerant of the more rigid European ways, creating openings for the Chinese.
(However, if this were true, would not trade have surged beginning in the years
immediately after the early 1670s rather than in the first half of the 18* century?)
Second, the development of the Co-Hong system of trade in Canton in the first part of
the 1700s led to the concentration of the European trading companies in Canton. In the
13 Chen, Historical Notes on Hoi An, pp. 25-6.
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large market in Canton the Europeans could obtain products from Vietnam (which were
brought from Vietnam by Chinese junks) as well as China, thus obviating the need to
make the trip south. (However, the Europeans, as we have seen, were only marginal to
Hoi An's development.) Third, the drastic reductions in trade imposed by the Japanese
in 1715 which limited the number of Chinese junks trading in Japan to about 30 per year
forced many Chinese junks to look to Southeast Asia for trade. (This seems to be a more
likely explanation.) Li Tana cites two other reasons for the trade boom: first,
Cochinchina's openness to trade with China and use of Chinese as trade intermediaries
and government officials, and second the relative cheapness of Chinese goods compared
with western goods.13 5 (One might also add that the Chinese goods were probably more
appropriate for the Vietnamese markets than western goods, though no doubt many
western traders were engaging in "country trade".) Although these factors perhaps
contributed to the increase, perhaps the best explanation for the jump in Hoi An's trade
during this period is that it coincided with the beginnings of the economic expansion in
Southeast Asia and boom in junk trade which peaked from the mid 18' century into the
first half of the 19* century.
For whatever reason, trade in Hoi An seemed to be booming by the
1740s, though once again our information comes mostly from foreign accounts. Pierre
Poivre, a Frenchman who lived in Cochinchina in 1742-3 as a missionary, was sent back
in 1749 on an official French mission to establish trade. Poivre claimed that as many as
60 junks from various Chinese ports visited Hoi An each year. J. Koffler, a foreigner
135 Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, p. 71.
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who lived in Cochinchina from 1740 to 1755 (initially as a missionary and then as
physician to the king), noted that "[e]very year, there are about 80 Chinese junks coming
to trade from various ports. Considering that the vessels keep coming also from Macao,
Batavia and France, you may understand the prosperity of commerce in this country."' 36
These estimates of the number of Chinese junks visiting Hoi An - from 60 to 80 annually
- dwarf the estimate of 10 to 12 Chinese junks provided by Bowyear in 1695 as well as
the previous total estimates of 13 to 20 ships per year for 1600-1650 and 14-24 ships per
year in the 1690s. In addition to these numbers of Chinese junks, there were still
European vessels that were visiting Hoi An regularly; the Portuguese were still sending
one to two each year, the Dutch resumed trade in the early 1750s, and the English and
French were beginning to get in the game. There would also have been the regular
visitors from ports in Southeast Asia (though by the mid 1700s many of these were
probably Chinese junks and likely included in the numbers for Chinese junks).
An account from one of the ship's officers on the 1749 Poivre mission
noted that there were only two cities in Cochinchina: Hue, with a population of 60,000,
and the second city of Hoi An. Hoi An is described as
"a port for Chinese sommes [junks] and local boats. Vessels from
Europe can anchor in the harbor in the fine season; but when the
monsoon comes, they are obliged to go and anchor in the Bay of Turon
[Danang] four lieues away where they are safe. Faifo is the place in
Cochinchina where most trade takes place during the season. It is the
depository for all the merchandise from China and the country. This is
a small city densely populated especially by Chinese who carry on a large
trade....
136 Chen, Historical Notes on Hoi An, p. 26 (citing Poivre's memoirs and
Koffier).
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.... [Hoi An] is the entrepot shared by all these goods. It is on the
banks of a large river which flows into the sea two lieues away. The
Chinese junks and local boats berth easily and enjoy the convenience of
loading and unloading alongside the quay. This city is the residence of
Chinese agents and all merchants of the kingdom who do business there.
At that time all sorts of goods from China for use by the Cochinchinese
are to be found, and in addition the pick of the choice goods peculiar to
the country. There is no comparison between the trading season and the
other seasons of the year. As soon as it is finished, the Chinese junks
leave and the merchants go home." 137
In addition to a resident Portuguese trader, the account further noted that
there was also an English trader living in Hoi An. The account also suggested that the
missionary presence in Cochinchina was significant. Interestingly, the account noted how
the Chinese "carry out the sounder part of the trade of the whole kingdom, and know the
place better than the Cochinchinese do," and described how the Chinese exploited the
"ignorance of the Cochinchinese, who are primitive and unable to reap the benefits which
exist in their country." 38
Robert Kirsop, the English trader we have previously encountered who
visited Hoi An in 1750, also noted how the "Chinefe have the greateft thare of the Trade
of Cochin-China...." His description of Hoi An was not especially flattering:
"The Town of Faifoe is little more than one very long narrow Street,
barely leaving room for a row of Houfes, on that fide next the River, the
beft, built on purpofe to let to the Chinefe Traders, are on the oppofite
side, which will fetch from 200 to 500 Quans a Seafon; there are other
137 See "Description of Cochinchina," in Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen:
Documents on Economic History, pp. 77 and 94.
138 Ibid, pp. 81-5, 95-6.
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fmaller, though commodious ehough, that may be had for 8 or 12 Quans
a Month."39
As for population, Koffier reported that only Chinese traders and
Cochinchinese were living in Hoi An (apparently Koffler did not meet up with the
Portugese trader and the Englishman) and that there were about 30,000 Chinese in all of
Cochinchina. An anonymous account written in the mid 1740s stated "[u]sually there are
about 6,000 Chinese living in this town [Hoi An]. They are all wealthy merchants
married to local women...." Yet another anonymous account written in the early 1780s
asserts that there 10,000 "married and taxpaying Chinese" living in Hoi An in 1750.'"
These latter two estimates of the Chinese population in Hoi An in the mid 1700s are the
first accounts which try to quantify the number of Chinese in Hoi An; none of the
previous accounts cited directly addressed this question. Added to the numbers of
Chinese was an expanding missionary presence (especially French) as well as foreign
traders.
The increased Chinese population was of course reflected in the
construction of new temples and assembly halls and the renovation of old ones. A
fascinating stone memorial in Chinese was added in 1741 to the Trung Hua Hoi Quan
(Assembly Hall for Maritime Commerce). The inscription enumerates the rules and
139 Robert Kirsop, "Some Account of Cochin China," pp. 244 and 249.
14 The estimates were all cited in Chen, Historical Notes on Hoi An, p.1 8.
Chen claims the increase of 4,000 Chinese from the mid-1740s to 1750
was related to a series of new measures undertaken by the Nguyen ruler
which presumably promoted economic development and encouraged trade,
especially with China.
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regulations of the assembly hall and provides a wonderful look into the life of Chinese
merchants in Hoi An. The regulations stipulate that each Chinese junk visiting Hoi An
should make a donation of three ly to the assembly hall for general use; a close
accounting of the funds will be maintained. (Judging by the regulations, this money was
used mostly (i) to help shipwrecked merchants and merchants who were forced to stay
in Hoi An after the end of the trading season, (ii) to help the sick and pay for burial
expenses, and (iii) presumably for maintenance and upkeep of the hall.) The hall will
provide quarters and a food allowance for shipwrecked merchants, the food allowance
limited to three months. If a merchant falls sick, he is allowed to stay indefinitely at the
hall. "Rogues and imposters" who do not work but "indulge themselves in gambling,
opium-taking and robbery and the like" are not allowed to stay at the hall. If a newcomer
marries a local woman who becomes pregnant, the baby needs to be registered with the
assembly hall (date of birth, name of father and mother, and father's native place in China
should all be recorded) so that the "baby may have proof of his identity when he grows
up.""
Yet this surge of trade in the 1740s and 1750s was to prove ephemeral;
within a few short years after reaching these incredible heights, trade was on the decline,
and within 20 or so years much of Hoi An would be destroyed. The best source of
information on Hoi An and Nguyen Cochinchina in general for the 1770s is the
impressive commentary produced by Le Quy Don, the Trinh scholar/official sent down
141 See Chen, Historical Notes on Hoi An, pp. 95-8 for the text of the inscrip-
tion.
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to the south after the Trinh occupation in 1774.142 Le Quy Don was intrigued by Hoi
An and the wealth it provided: quoting a Chinese trader (date uncertain), he notes that
Hoi An is a place of such abundance "that seemingly nothing cannot be obtained there;
it is superior to all the other ports of Southeast Asia. The goods come from Thang Hoa,
Dien Ban, Quy Nhon, Quang Ngai, Binh Khang and Nha Trang, carried by ships, boats
and horses, by land and by sea, and assembled in Hoi An.... The goods are so abundant
here that even a hundred large ships could not carry them all away from here." As
impressed with the wealth and trade of the south as he apparently was, Le Quy Don also
recognized that trade at Hoi An by this time was much smaller than before, and notes
that in 1771 only 16 ships came to Hoi An, in 1772 only 12 ships came, and in 1773 only
six ships came." 3 Thus by the early 1770s trade at Hoi An had clearly suffered a
precipitous decline from its height some 20 years previously, even as the junk trade in
Southeast Asia was entering its peak period from about 1760 to the 1820s. We noted
previously the likely reasons for this decline: royal extravaganza, monetization of the
economy, a severe cash shortage, a misguided domestic coinage minting program,
severe inflation, refusal of traders to use the new coins, and ill-timed increases in shipping
duties all fed off each other to reduce foreign trade in dramatic fashion.
142 Le Quy Don was sent down south in 1776 to help restore the civil govern-
ment. He stayed six months and wrote the Phu Bien Tap Luc, which is a
six volume compilation describing life in the south - a sort of "historical
guidebook," as Woodside suggests. See "Miscellaneous Nguyen Records
Seized in 1775-6," in Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents on
Economic History, and Woodside, "Central Vietnam's Trading World," in
Essays into Vietnamese Pasts. Woodside provides an excellent overall
analysis of Le Quy Don's report.
13 See "Miscellaneous Nguyen Records Seized in 1775-6," in Southern
Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents on Economic History, p. 116.
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The Tayson rebellion, which broke out in the early 1770s, provided the
proverbial nail in the coffin for both Nguyen Cochinchina and Hoi An. Much of Hoi An,
along with the rest of the country, was destroyed during the course of the outbreak.
Charles Chapman headed a British mission sent to Vietnam in 1778 to investigate the
Tayson rebellion and resulting war and determine if the British could use the war for both
political and commercial gain. His description of Hoi An reflects the devastation which
so quickly befell the town:
"On arriving at Faifo we were surprised to find the recent ruins of a large
city; the streets laid out on a regular plan paved with flat stone and well
built brick houses on each side. But alas, there was not little more
remaining than the outward walls within which, in a few places, you
might behold a wretch who formerly was the possessor of a palace
sheltering himself from the weather in a miserable hut of straw and
bamboos. Of the few edifices left standing was a wooden bridge built
upon piles over a narrow arm of the river with a tiled roof. The temples
and their wooden gods were no further molested than in being robbed of
their bells which I understand the present usurper had seized for the
purposes of coining them into money.""
The surviving bridge referred to was most certainly Hoi An's famous Japanese bridge.
The account also indicated that there was a continuing shortage in coinage, as temple
bells were melted into coins.
14 See Lamb, Mandarin Road to Old Hue, Part II; quote from p.105.
Chapman indicated that Danang would be the best place to set up a trading
factory (pp.134, 136).
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PART Vi. HOI AN IN THE VIETNAMESE CONTEXT.
Thus far we have examined Hoi An in its role as an international entrepot.
We have seen how Hoi An during its golden age was the product of the two converging
forces of a surge in international trade and a newly established state searching for an
economic means of survival. In this Part VI, we examine more closely Hoi An's role in
the context of Vietnam and Nguyen Cochinchina. We first look at Hoi An's function as
a center of local trade. We then look at Hoi An's role in the fostering of economic
development within Nguyen Cochinchina, and we conclude with a discussion of the
political importance of Hoi An.
A. Center of Local Trade.
We have seen how merchants from a variety of places - China, Japan,
Europe, and Southeast Asia - came to Hoi An to exchange their goods with each other
as well as with the Vietnamese. Another lure for these traders, especially for those
whose ultimate destination was China or Japan, was the availability of local products,
because Hoi An, in addition to and as part of its role as an international entrepot, also
served as a local trade entrepot, attracting goods from all over Cochinchina, the
highland areas ofmodern Laos and Cambodia, and the Trinh-ruled north Vietnam. These
goods were channeled down through Hoi An and eventually made their way to various
overseas destinations. We can also speculate that many of these goods were 'consumed'
internally on their way to Hoi An. For example, it is quite likely that a variety of products
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which came from the mountain areas such as eaglewood and aromatic woods were used
by the Cochinchinese themselves before reaching Hoi An.
Hoi An's role as a local center of trade was made clear in a number of
accounts from the 18' century. First, as the account from the Poivre mission of 1749-50
noted:
"the Cochinchinese come down from the mountains bringing choice
goods like silks, raw silk and eaglewood, in girdles or rattan baskets tied
to both ends of a flexible and pliant bamboo cane which they put over
their shoulders and the weight of which they distribute evenly to make the
load easier to carry. The village and aldeas [areas?] located along the
coast or within reach of rivers convey the bulky goods such as rice,
sugar, pepper, iron, etc., by water. The city of Faifo in the province of
Thiam is the entrepot shared by all these goods [italics added]."'
Similarly, as we saw in Part V, Le Quy Don's Phu Bien Tap Luc some 25 years later
quoted a Chinese trader who noted that
"such an abundance of goods can be carried from Quang Nam that
seemingly nothing cannot be obtained there....goods come from Thang
Hoa, Dien Ban, Quy Non, Quang Ngai, Binh Khang and Nha Trang [all
areas or ports in Cochinchina], carried by ships, boats and horses, by
land and sea, and assembled in Hoi An [italics added]. That is why the
Chinese like to come and buy goods to carry back. The goods are so
abundant here that even a hundred large ships could not carry them all
away from here."
It may be useful to review the types of local goods traded in Hoi An as
a prelude to discussing how these goods actually came to Hoi An. The various accounts
145 See "Description of Cochinchina," in Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen:
Documents on Economic History, p. 94.
14 See "Miscellaneous Nguyen Records Seized in 1775-6," in Southern
Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents on Economic History, p.116.
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of trade in Hoi An indicate that there was a wide variety of local goods available in the
town which can be divided into roughly three groups. First, there were the goods from
the forest and highland/mountain areas, such as calambac, eaglewood, other precious
woods such as rosewood and ironwood, skins and horns, and other forest products.
Second, there were cultivated goods such as silk, pepper, sugar and cotton, which
presumably came for the most part from the settled lowland areas under Nguyen control
(see B below for more on this). The third broad category of goods were marine products,
such as sharks fin, shrimp, and birdnests (which obviously came from the coastal areas
or islands).
Given the types of goods available as well as the various descriptions we
have of internal commerce, it appears that these goods arrived in Hoi An through three
primary means: first, via the sea along Vietnam's long coastline, second, by river, and
lastly, to a much lesser extent, overland. 4 7 Each of these means is considered below.
The use of water routes - river and sea- is particularly important due to the nature of
central Vietnam's geography, which is characterized by a fairly narrow coastal strip, with
the South China Sea to the east and mountains running north-south to the west. These
mountains, which are difficult to traverse by land, are crisscrossed by numerous rivers
(most of which empty into the sea), which provide the primary means of east-west
147 Although I was quite aware of the importance of the coast and river as a
means of conveying goods, I acknowledge Charles Wheeler's discussion of
these three routes in Cross Cultural Trade and Trans-Regional Networks
pp. 55-60. Wheeler's coinage of the term'Vietnamese coastal highway'
seems particularly appropriate. He also highlighted the importance of
overland routes, which given Vietnam's geography would seem to be much
less important than the water routes.
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transport and communication. As rivers allow for east-west intercourse, the South China
Sea allows for north-south intercourse. As many historians have noted, the features of
central Vietnam - the geographical dominance of difficult-to-traverse land, of the
numerous crisscrossing river systems, and of the sea itself - are similar to the geography
of the Malay part of Southeast Asia, notably Sumatra."
From the Poivre and Le Quy Don accounts we can get a sense of the
importance of the coast and the sea in delivering local products to Hoi An. The Poivre
account noted how the villages and areas along the coast were critical to the conveyance
of goods to Hoi An; Le Quy Don's description highlighted how goods came to Hoi An
by sea from various coastal areas and seaports along the coast. It is evident that the coast
and sea were vital to the conveyance of the three types of goods in three distinct ways.
First, the 'coastal highway' (to use Wheeler's term) was a critical link for goods from the
upland areas which were first transported along river systems to points along the coast
(more on this below) and then were transported up or down the coast to Hoi An.
Second, the coastal highway allowed for goods from the various areas along the coast,
as well as goods from North Vietnam, to reach Hoi An. "' Third, the sea was the source
148 See Wheeler, Cross Cultural Trade and Trans-Regional Networks, pp. 41-
5, for a good discussion of the geography of Central Vietnam. See also
Hall, Maritime Trade and State Development, pp. 12-15 and Chapter
Seven, for more on river systems and central and south Vietnam.
149 For more on the trade between the Trinh North Vietnam and Cochinchina,
see Do Bang, "Relations between the Port Cities in Dang Trong and Pho
Hien in the 17th-18th Centuries," in Pho Hien: The Center of Interna-
tional Commerce in the XVII-XVIII Centuries, (Hanoi, Vietnam, Gioi
Publishers, 1994), pp.195-203.
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of the marine goods sold in Hoi An's market. Indicative of the importance of the coast
and sea to Cochinchina was sea was the size of the merchant fleet of Cochinchina which
plied the coast in 1768 - 447 vessels.'"O
River systems were another critical means of transport of goods to Hoi
An. We can distinguish between two categories of river systems with respect to Hoi An's
trade. First, as suggested above, river systems both to the north and south of Hoi An
were critical because they provided the means by which forest products such as calambac
reached the coastal areas from the mountains. Le Quy Don once again provided an
interesting description of this trade in Phu Bien Tap Luc. He noted how the Cam Lo
River, located north of Hue in today's Quang Binh Prefecture, served as a major trade
link between Vietnam and various places in Laos (which in turn were linked to places in
Thailand): "Cam Lo village of Dang Xuong county was upstream of Dieu [Ao] Giang
[today's Cam Lo River], which leads to Cua Viet [Viet Harbor] downstream and
upstream to Ai Lao [Laos], so all the barbarians went upstream to the kingdoms of Lac
Hon [Savannakhet] and Van Tuong [Vientienne], and to the prefectures ofTranNinh [on
the Laotian border of modern Nge An province] and Quy Non [Nge An province]."
(Place names provided by translator). He also noted the numerous tollgates and taxes
payable on goods passing through the river. He then described the trade which took
place along the river - the traders from other places (presumably Vietnamese from the
coast) who brought salt, fish sauce, dried fish, ironware, copper pots, silver hairpins and
150 See Do Bang, "The Relations and Pattern of Trade between Hoi An and
the Inland," in Ancient Town of Hoi An (pp. 149-158), p.150.
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bracelets in exchange for miller, chickens, ox, hemp, wax rattan, mulberry bark, cloth,
curtains, and rice from the 'barbarian people' (presumably the people living in the area
and/or highlanders).'"' Another important river system, this one south of Hoi An, was
the Ba River, with the town of An Khe serving as a key trading center along the river;
this system connected Cambodia and the trans-Mekong basin to the Vietnamese coast
at Quy Non and was a primary conduit for calambac and other luxury goods as well as
non-luxury goods such as betel nut. 152
The second 'category' of river system is the Thu Bon itself, the system
along which Hoi An is located. The Thu Bon system was the primary river system of
Central Vietnam and had the largest water capacity of any river system in Central
Vietnam. Thus the Thu Bon penetrated deeply into the mountains of Central Vietnam
and provided a direct link from the uplands to Hoi An; it also spread throughout
Quangnam. Hoi An was located close to the sea, not far from two major river crossings
of Ban Thach and Cua Dai. These and other river crossings in turn linked Hoi An to a
number of waterways which ran close to or parallel to the coast and linked Hoi An to
other important ports such as Danang. As Wheeler describes, by the second half of the
18' century there was an extensive system of taxation along the Thu Bon system, and
the focal point of the riverine trade was not Hoi An but Cho Cui, about 10 kilometers
151 See "Miscellaneous Nguyen Records Seized in 1775-6," in Southern
Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents on Economic History, pp. 110-2.
152 Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, pp. 122-3.
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upriver from Hoi An.153 Thus, goods from the mountains and other places upriver were
gathered at Cho Cui and then sent along down river to Hoi An; in return, goods from
overseas and other parts of Vietnam were collected in Hoi An and sent upstream.
The above description of the Thu Bon and other river systems in Central
Vietnam closely resembles Bennet Bronson's model of riverine-based polities in the
Malay world. i4 Bronson describes a riverine polity whose center is a port located near
the mouth of a large river system. By virtue of its strategic location, the port is able to
control movement of people and goods along the river, which is the prime means of
transportation for this type of geographical area. The polity's ability to act as a
gatekeeper of riverine traffic for the entire system as well as a middleman (between the
hinterlands and foreign traders) keeps the polity's finances running smoothly and
provides economic benefits to those upstream who provide the critical trade goods (such
153 See Vu Van Phai and Dang Van Bao, "Geomorphical Features of Hoi An
and its Neighborhood," in Ancient Town of Hoi An, p.57, Tran Ky
Phuong and Vu Huu Minh, "Cua Dai Chiem (Port of Great Champa) in the
4th-15th Centuries," in Ancient Town of Hoi An, p.80, Tranh Quoc
Vuong, "Geo-Historical Position and Geo-Cultural Identity of Hoi An," in
Ancient Town of Hoi An, p. 35-6, and Wheeler, Cross Cultural Trade and
Trans-Regional Networks, pp. 57-8. Wheeler provides the most complete
description of the Thu Bon system.
"4 See Bennett Bronson, "Exchange at the Upstream and Downstream Ends:
Toward a Functional Model of the Coastal State in Southeast Asia," in
Economic Exchange and Social Interaction in Southeast Asia: Perspec-
tives from Prehistory, History and Ethnography, Karl Hutterer, ed.,
Michigan Papers on Southeast Asia, 13 (Ann Arbor, 1978), pp. 39-52. See
also Jan Wisseman Christie, "State Formation in Early Maritime Southeast
Asia: A Consideration of the Theories and the Data," in Bijdragen tot de
Taal, Land en Volkenkunde 151, 2 (1995), pp. 235-287, especially 269-
72.
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as forest products) so sought after by foreign traders. This flow of wealth not only
maintains loyalties and security but also ensures the continual flow of trade goods from
the hinterlands to the port. As the more distant upstream areas were the source of these
goods, relations with the more distant upstream areas are more egalitarian and less
coercive than might be thought (conversely, the closer upriver another area is, particular
river junctures which serve as trading points, the more likely it is for coercion to be
featured in the relationship). Indeed, trade - both with upstream areas as well as with
other river systems and internationally - is critical to the survival of the polity, since it has
few agricultural or other resources under its direct control. This type of polity obviously
requires the existence of an overseas center, or foreign traders, to purchase the goods
sourced from upstream. The natural rival of this type of polity is its neighboring river
system, as both are competing for trade revenue. Expansion beyond the river system is
accomplished
"by subordinating (through a combination of force and inducement)- but
not absorbing- their neighbors, forming hierarchies of ports under a
dominant ruling family. The major threats to the stability of these states
were the defection of outlying areas under the leadership of local datu or
ambitious younger sons of the dominant ruling family, instability of
relations within the court, and economic weakness caused by a decline in
trade or smuggling. The size and complexity of port states of this type
depended to a large degree upon the wealth passing through the hands of
the ruler, since this wealth was normally converted directly into political
power through generosity to clients and the maintenance of personal
armies."1 "
Kenneth Hall has convincingly applied this model to central Vietnam in
his description of the various Cham polities and their economic and political relations
1" Wisseman Christie, "State Formation," p. 271.
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with other entities in the 101 and 11* centuries.'* Recall also that the Cham capital from
the 5' to 10* centuries (as well as a major trading port - possibly the same city) was in
the Thu Bon River system in the Hoi An area. The Hoi An of the 17m and 18 centuries
has many of the same characteristics as the polities described in the Ironson/Hall model,
suggesting that Hoi An was one of a long line of riverine polities based in central
Vietnam along the Thu Bon river. Perhaps the most glaring difference between Hoi An
of the 17' and 18* centuries and these previous riverine/port centers is that Hoi An
never served as the political capital of the polity (see Section C below).
Returning to our discussion oftransport ofgoods, the Poivre and Le Quy
Don descriptions also indicate that another means of transport was overland, sometimes
even by road. Overland routes likely were used where water routes were not available,
at least in the upland areas. Certainly goods had to be carried overland to the various
rivers before they could be sent via river downstream to the sea. We can perhaps
speculate that overland routes were more likely to be used for shorter distances, whereas
water routes were more likely to be used for longer distances. Roads also paralleled
some of the river systems as well as the coastline" 7, and we can also speculate that roads
were located - and used - far more in the settled, lowland areas than in the upland areas.
156 See Hall, Maritime Trade and State Development, Chapter 7.
"' Wheeler, Cross Cultural Trade and Trans-Regional Networks, pp. 58-60.
Wheeler provides the best description of overland routes that I have found.
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Who exactly were the merchants involved in this local trade? The primary
accounts and secondary literature do not provide much information on this point, but we
can speculate that it was likely a combination of highland peoples, local peoples, Chams,
Vietnamese, and later, as the period wore on, the Chinese."' If we think of local trade
from a spacial or geographic perspective, we can posit two general suppositions. First,
with respect to trade involving the highlands (east-west trade), the closer to the coastal
areas and Hoi An the trade occurred, the more likely that the trade was carried out by
Vietnamese; conversely, the closer to the highland areas the trade was, the more likely
that it was carried out by highlanders, locals and Chams. This makes sense given the
overall Vietnamese inability (or reluctance) to penetrate the mountain areas, which
largely remained the preserve of highland peoples. We saw from Le Quy Don's
description oftrade with uplanders that apparently Vietnamese were trading directly with
the "barbarians"; presumably the extent ofVietnamese traders' penetration westward into
the highlands varied according to the river system. Li Tana has suggested that the Chams
played the crucial role of middlemen in trade between Vietnamese and uplanders,
158 This discussion risks a protracted and ill-advised venture into the defini-
tions of'Vietnamese', uplanders, locals and Chams. Indeed, as noted in
Part II, many historians have suggested that a new identity of'being
Vietnamese' was being created as part of the nam tien, an identity which
mixed many of these groups. I hope to keep the discussion sufficiently
abstract to avoid delving into this tricky area. In addition, the following
discussion neglects the role of women in local trade. See Wheeler, Cross
Cultural Trade and Trans-Regional Networks, pp. 142-9 for a discussion
of the role of women in both local and international trade.
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especially trade involving calambac; this role can be attributed in part to the long and
close relationships between the Chains and uplanders.'"'
The second supposition is with respect to north-south trade along the
coast. We saw earlier how the Hoi An area had long been involved in international trade,
even before the Vietnamese began arriving in great numbers around the turn of the 17
century. This meant that the Chains and other local peoples were well versed in trade
matters, and we can expect to see significant involvement in trade by Chains and other
locals at the beginning of the 1600s. We can also speculate that as more Vietnamese
came south over the course of the 17 and 18 centuries, the more likely it was that
Chain and other local traders were displaced. As the Vietnamese push westward was
limited by the mountains and thus nam ien was directed southward along the coasts and
into the Mekong Delta area, we can further speculate that Vietnamese displacement of
Cham and other local traders was much greater along the coasts and southward than was
Vietnamese displacement of local traders in the highlands.
Another consideration with respect to local trade is the role of the
Chinese. We can suppose that as the period wore on and the Chinese presence in
Cochinchina continued to expand, the Vietnamese traders themselves were to some
extent- but not entirely - replaced by the Chinese. Chinese penetration into local trade
159 Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, pp. 123-5. Interestingly, Li Tana notes that
one of the three brothers who led the Tayson rebellion was a betel nut
trader in the An Khe area (the gateway between the Quy Nhon commercial
region (south of Hoi An) and the trans-Mekong basin region) who traded
primarily with uplanders.
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is a natural extension of the Chinese dominance in international trade. We can further
speculate that Chinese displacement of Vietnamese traders was more likely to occur
along the coast and lowland areas. The extent over time and space of the Chinese
penetration of local trade and the displacement of Vietnamese traders, however, will
likely remain an open question due to the lack of data. One piece of evidence we do
have comes from the 1750 account of the Poivre mission, which in passing notes that
"there are many of them [Chinese] in the interior of the country and as far as Cambodia,
Champa and Laos... the Chinese consequently carry out the sounder part of the trade of
the whole kingdom, and know the place better than the Cochinchinese do."'1 Chinese
penetration and domination of local trade markets in central and especially south Vietnam
would be virtually complete one hundred years later.
On the other hand, perhaps one indication of limited Chinese involvement
in local trade was the apparent lack of any revenue farms awarded to Chinese in
Cochinchina during this period. Revenue farming was a common feature of other parts
of Southeast Asia during this time, both in areas under indigenous control such as
Thailand and parts of Java, but also in areas under colonial control such as Dutch Java.'61
160 See "Description of Cochinchina," in Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen:
Documents on Economic History, p. 85.
161 See Blusse, Strange Company, Chapter Five; Leonard Andaya, "Interac-
tions with the Outside World and Adaptation in Southeast Asian Society,
1500-1800," in The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Volume I,
Nicholas Tarling, ed. (Cambridge, U.K., Cambridge University Press, 2 d
printing, 1994) pp. 347-8; Anthony Reid, "Economic and Social Change,
c. 1400-1800," in The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Volume I, p.
497.
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Awards of revenue farms are intricately linked to knowledge of and involvement in local
trade, as there is no reason to award someone a revenue farm if the person has no
knowledge of the local system. Although we know the Chinese held some important
positions in government relating to trade and likely controlled much of the international
trade out of Hoi An, there is no mention of revenue farming (opium farming, tax
collection farming, etc.) in any ofthe literature relating to Cochinchina during this period
with respect to the Chinese or any other group (it was common after 1802 and under the
French, with most of the awards going to the Chinese)."
B. Role in Economic Development.
It is clear that the trade fostered by Hoi An resulted in great economic
growth and development in Cochinchina. Demand from the international entrepot trade
spurred the production of local agricultural products, the collection of forest and marine
products, and even the production of small-scale manufactured goods, from all over
Cochinchina. Trade also fostered the growth of services supporting trade, such as the
construction of houses, hotels and rest houses, ship maintenance and repair facilities, to
name but a few, both in Hoi An and along key trading points which fed into Hoi An.
This section explores some of the ways in which Hoi An as a major trade entrepot
contributed to the economic development of Cochinchina.
162 Wheeler does suggest that some of the royal monopolies were farmed out
to relatives and local traders, but does not provide enough information to
determine if this type of farming approximates the revenue farming with
which we are concerned. See footnote 16 above.
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We can begin this closer examination by again focusing on one of the
types of local goods sold in Hoi An cultivated agricultural products such as silk (and
also silk products, which require silk cultivation), sugar and pepper, each of which were
cultivated throughout the 17 and 18 centuries. These crops all require a certain
amount of land and care to grow. Although the actual acreage of land planted and the
tonnage of crop produced will never be known, the amounts were significant enough so
that we can say with certainty that trade forces did foster commercial crop production.163
Thuan Hoa - the area of Central Vietnam which today is roughly Quang Binh and Quang
Tri - was a major source of pepper.'" Mulberry trees were grown and silkworms raised
in the area stretching from Hoi An south to Qui Nonh (in today's Binh Dinh province),
which along with Quang Ngai was a well-known as a silk producing area; many mulberry
trees were grown along rivers. Similarly, sugar was grown in the same general area, and
Quang Ngai in particular was well-known for its sugar.' 5 Thus, in all ofthese areas, land
163 For example, Li Tana has estimated that foreign (primarily Japanese)
demand for sugar resulted in at least a doubling of black sugar production
in Cochinchina from the early 1640s to the early 1660s. Li Tana, Nguyen
Cochinchina, pp. 80-1.
" According to the report of Jeronimus Wonderaer, the Dutch merchant
searching for pepper in Cochinchina in 1602, Thuan Hoa was the source
for most of the pepper he attempted to buy. See "Trials of a Foreign
Merchant," in passim, in Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents
on Economic History. Le Quy Don in 1776 also noted that pepper - but
practically nothing else - was available in Thuan Hoa. See "Miscellaneous
Nguyen Records Seized in 1775-6," in Southern Vietnam under the
Nguyen: Documents on Economic History, p. 116.
165 See Phan Dai Doan, "Hoi An and Dang Trong," in Ancient Town of Hoi
An, pp. 160-70; see also "Description of Cochinchina," in Southern
Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents on Economic History, p. 90, and
"Miscellaneous Nguyen Records Seized in 1775-6," in Southern Vietnam
(continued...)
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was settled and cultivated so crops could be grown. This naturally gave rise to new
villages and hamlets to house the cultivators of these lands.
Production of these crops also resulted in economic specialization. For
example, production of silk requires not only the growing of mulberry trees but also the
growing and nurturing of silkworms. Production of silk (and cotton) fabrics requires
further specialization such as spinning and weaving. Le Quy Don noted that numerous
villages specialized in silk weaving:
"There was a settlement called Thai Van southeast of Phu Xuan River,
between the three villages of Son Dien, Duong Xuan and Van Xuan.
This settlement was divided into three hamlets, and each hamlet consisted
of ten households, each of which had fifteen weavers. It was said that a
remote ancestor of these families came from the prefecture of Thang
Hoa, Quang Nam. He learnt weaving from the Chinese and the skill was
passed on from generation to generation. They could weave coloured
silk, gauze, damask silk, brocade and all kinds of beautiful silks."166
He goes on to note how many of these silk producing areas actually paid taxes in the
form of silk bolts. Similarly, Li Tana has described the specialization necessary in the
production of sugar. Different households were involved in growing the sugar cane,
processing the cane into juice, and refining the juice into white sugar. In addition,
because sugar was stored in urns, the increased sugar production also stimulated the
165 (...continued)
under the Nguyen: Documents on Economic History, p. 121.
166 See "Miscellaneous Nguyen Records Seized in 1775-6," in Southern
Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents on Economic History, p. 121.
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growth of the urnindustry."'7 We can imagine that similar economic specialization and
growth took place with respect to virtually every product that was marketed in Hoi An.
Economic growth and development must also have occurred not only
with respect to the goods traded but also with respect to trade-related activities. The
shipbuilding industry provides a good example. Waterborne vessels are required for two
reasons: first, to venture to the sea to collect and transport to Hoi An the marine
products sold in the market, and second to transport via river and sea various products
from the mountains and other parts of Cochinchina to Hoi An. As noted in Section A
above, river and sea transport were critical to the movement of goods to Hoi An, and the
shipbuilding industry must have grown tremendously as trade grew (recall that in 1768
there were 447 vessels in Cochinchina's merchant fleet). Hoi An itself was a center of
barge construction and has long been known for its particular wooden sailing barge with
Cham and Malay features; there are villages around Hoi An which specialize in the
making of this barge.'69
Another example oftrade-related development was the growthofvarious
local trading points along rivers and the coast which fed into Hoi An such as Tam Ky and
Nuoc Man."' As these towns grew and became local centers of trade, trade-related
167 Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, p. 84.
168 See Nguyen Boi Lien, Tran Van An and Nguyen Van Phi, "Hoi An-Quang
Region's Wooden Barges," in Ancient Town of Hoi An, pp. 86-9.
'6 See Phan Dai Doan, "Hoi An and Dang Trong," in Ancient Town of Hoi
(continued...)
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activities such as inns, guesthouses, food supply, and boat repair and maintenance must
also have developed. We can speculate that the number of smaller settlements along the
rivers and coast which supported trade activities was for all intents and purpose
innumerable. Similar to what we saw above with respect to trade leading to the clearing
and settlement of new lands for agricultural production, in this case trade led to the
growth of small towns which served to support trade.
One unfortunate side effect of this growth in commerce and increasing
economic specialization may have been diversion of labor away from rice production in
central Vietnam to more lucrative crops. This, and perhaps to a certain extent a shortage
of land suitable for rice cultivation, resulted in central Vietnam's being forced to rely on
rice imports from Cambodia and Siam in the 17h century and the Mekong Delta area in
the 18" century. 0 This dependence led to a number of crises and shortages of rice, such
as when Cambodia limited rice exports in 1636. In addition, when in the 18 * century
rice production began to take off in the Mekong delta area and central Vietnam became
dependent on it for rice, the Nguyen rulers were forced to become more involved in the
southern region, which was not yet under their firm control. Transport of rice to central
Vietnam became a major concern, and demands by the government on provinces in
central Vietnam - notably Quy Nhon - to address this problem may have been too high
and contributed to the Tayson rebellion.
169 (...continued)
An, p. 172.
170 See Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, pp. 84 and 144-48. This discussion of
the rice trade is taken from her account.
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Commercial crop production, the spiderweb of activity resulting from
increased crop production, the increased gathering of forest and marine products, the
trade-related activities described above necessary to support increased trade, and even
the allocation of labor resources away from rice production and into more wealth-
generating crops, were all "pull" factors drawing Vietnamese south into Nguyen
Cochinchina from the northern heartland. That is, the economic opportunity generated
by these activities surely must have attracted settlers to the new lands of the south.
Though no data are available, we can speculate that it was largely Vietnamese
immigrants from the north who fulilled these jobs, although certainly Chams, other locals
and Chinese also rushed to supply the demand."' One is almost reminded of the
attraction the American west had for Americans in the second half of the 19' century,
even if there was no single dramatic, precipitating event such as the gold rush.
171 Bulbeck, Reid, et al. claim that it was Chinese immigrants who began to
develop cultivation of sugar around the turn of the 17' century in central
Vietnam and indeed grew or managed production of sugar thereafter. See
Bulbeck, Reid, et al, Southeast Asian Exports Since the J4l Century, pp.
107, 111. Unfortunately, no sources are cited for this claim. Indeed this
seems difficult to believe, given the limited numbers of Chinese in
Cochinchina (four to five thousand in the early 1640s according to Fran-
cisco), most of whom were engaged in trade. Surely Vietnamese labor
was used extensively, and it seems more likely that the Chinese were
'managing' rather than actually cultivating. No other sources I found
mentioned such a large role in commercial crop production for the Chinese
in the 17' century, and to my knowledge even commercial crop produc-
tion in the 19' century (with the exception of pepper) was left in Vietnam-
ese hands, even if Chinese controlled the trade in the crop (such as rice).
Nevertheless, this does not detract from concept of economic opportunity
acting as a magnet and drawing Vietnamese south.
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Another likely impact of the trade fostered by Hoi An was monetization.
Although hard to prove, it is quite likely that money and coinage were increasingly used
in economic exchanges instead of trade in kind. We saw in Part II how the Nguyen were
- initially by choice - dependent on Japanese and Chinese coinage but became
increasingly desperate for cash as the Japanese and Chinese supplies dried up; it was this
desperation which led to the Nguyen to mint their own currency in the 1740s, which in
turn led to such high inflation and economic ruin. One reason for this increasing need
for cash was perhaps the increasing monetization of Cochinchina which was fostered by
the growth in trade. Moreover, as people became more familiar with the concept of
'money', it was perhaps more difficult to revert to trade-in-kind. How deeply did
monetization penetrate, and what percentage of transactions were carried out in cash
rather than in kind? Again, this is extremely difficult to ascertain. Le Quy Don's account
of trade with highlanders notes that there were various trade tollgates along rivers with
fixed taxes of varying amounts of quan, presumably payable in cash (but he does not
specify this). He also notes the price and tax on various goods traded by the highlanders
as well as a personal tax on highlanders; these are quoted in quan or other measures of
cash, which suggests that cash was commonly used in Vietnamese-highlander economic
transactions (he does not mention in-kind transactions, but absent a specific comment on
the non-existence of in-kind transactions this possibility should not be rejected).'"
172 See "Miscellaneous Nguyen Records Seized in 1775-6," in Southern
Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents on Economic History, pp.110-
113.
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Did the increasing economic development and resulting prosperity filter
down to the common man? Li Tana suggests that another look at the types of items sold
in the Hoi An markets may address this question. The abundance of trade goods, and in
particular the abundance of goods of everyday consumption such as medicine, clothing,
copperware, tea, foods, and objects of personal adornment, indicate that there was a
trickle down effect. She also points to visitors accounts of Cochinchina. 13 Le Quy Don,
in particular, was effusive in his description of the standard of living in Cochinchina:
"both officials and the common people were wealthy and accustomed to fancy things.
Their lifestyles tended to be even fancier during the Nguyen Phuc period [1738-1765].
Because he himself liked luxury, his subjects all followed him and luxury became the
norm for them." He goes on to describe the types of goods that officials, commoners,
soldiers and women were accustomed to: satin shirts with flowers and damask trousers
as everyday garb for commoners (wearing cotton was considered a disgrace), and women
were all dressed in gauze, ramie and silk, with embroidered collars. "People here looked
upon gold and silver as sand, millet and rice as mud; their lives could not be more
extravagant."174  While Le Quy Don may have been exaggerating' 75 , he was clearly
impressed by the wealth of Cochinchina. This relatively high standard of living was
certainly another pull factor drawing Vietnamese south to Cochinchina.
173 See Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, pp.85-87.
174 See "Miscellaneous Nguyen Records Seized in 1775-6," in Southern
Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents on Economic History, p.1 24.
175 Both Li Tana and Woodside believe that Le Quy Don, for a number of
reasons, may have exaggerated his description of the wealth of the south.
See Li Tana, Nguyen Cochinchina, p. 85-6, and Alexander Woodside,
"Central Vietnam's Trading World," p. 166.
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C. Political Importance.
We have seen how foreign trade was instrumental to the Nguyen rulers
of Cochinchina. In addition to stimulating local economic development, trade provided
much-needed revenue to the Nguyen as well as weaponry to hold off the Trinh. Hoi An
was the center of trade in Cochinchina, and indeed served as the economic center of
Cochinchina; it would be logical for the Nguyen to establish their capital in Hoi An in
order to control this economic center which was such a vital component of the Nguyen
regime. In other parts of maritime Southeast Asia, important ports which functioned as
primary economic centers typically also functioned as the political centers of the polity
(e.g., Srivijaya, Banten, Aceh, Makassar, Ayutthaya). The Bronson riverine model we
discussed in Section A above would also suggest that these economic centers along the
river or coast would also serve as centers of political power.176 Such was not the case
176 Although Wolters in his formulation of the 'mandala' theory of traditional
Southeast Asian polities does not discuss the economic foundations of the
mandala, it seems to me that the shape and center of Wolters' mandala
must be driven in part by economic power. Thus I would suggest that the
center of Wolter's mandala is invariably where the economic power of the
mandala is concentrated. The mandala features "overlapping circles of
kings" within which one king claims "universal authority" and "personal
hegemony over the other rulers in his mandala who in theory were his
obedient allies and vassals...In practice, the mandala...represented a
particular and often unstable political situation in a vaguely definable
geographical area without fixed boundaries and where smaller centers
tended to look in all directions for security. The mandalas would expand
and contract in concertina-like fashion. Each one contained several
tributary rulers, some of whom would repudiate their vassal status when
the opportunity arose and try to build up their own networks of vassals."
O.W. Wolters, History, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspec-
tives (revised edition, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1999), pp.
27-8. The Hoi An area during the Cham period certainly had some of these
(continued...)
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with respect to Cochinchina, however. The capital always remained north of the Hai
Van pass, the highest and most important pass along the land route south: until 1636, the
capital was located around modern-day Quang Tr, and after 1636 the capital was located
around the Hue area.177
Why, then, was Hoi An never the residence of the Nguyen rulers? What
allowed - or required - the Nguyen to separate business from politics? Keith Taylor has
suggested that the location of the capital north of Hoi An, at least during the early
Nguyen rule, may have been a reflection of the continued preoccupation of the Nguyen
rulers with the Trinh in the north. That is, the Nguyen still had designs on ruling the
north and wanted to remain in an area with closer access to the north, and "Hoi An was
a source of enrichment and nothing more." 78 (One also wonders whether the Hai Van
pass served as a geographical and symbolic hurdle to the south which the Nguyen were
unable to overcome, which may explain why the capital always remained north of the
176 (...continued)
features.
177 See Chen, Historical Notes on Hoi An, pp. 8-9, for more on the location
of the capital. John Whitmore in a personal communication made the
observation regarding the location north of the Hai Van pass. One might
argue that because there was a trading center outside of Hue, Hue falls
into the category of political centers located in economic centers of
maritime Southeast Asia. However, the Hue trading community was far
smaller than Hoi An, and Hoi An was undisputably the economic center of
Cochinchina.
178 Taylor, "Nguyen Hoang and Vietnam's Southward Expansion," pp. 50, 63-
4. Taylor notes how an important garrison was establish in 1602 about
some 15-20 kilometers upriver from Hoi An, a place "admirably located to
supervise the port - without being dominated by it."
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pass.) Surely this attitude changed somewhat as time wore on and the independence of
the south was established, yet Hoi An never became the capital.
A more concrete explanation offered by a number of Vietnamese
historians is security. The Nguyen rulers were afraid of the power of foreign traders,
who under some circumstances might be able to challenge the political authority of the
Nguyen rulers, and consequently these traders were confined to a port distant from the
capital area. Likewise the rulers may have been afraid of disruptions in social order
caused by the presence of foreign traders. Thus, it was most likely fear of foreign
domination which resulted in a separation of the political and economic centers. This
bifurcation was also a feature of Trinh North Vietnam, with its capital at Thang Long
(modern Hanoi) and foreign trade center of Pho Hien located down river closer to the
sea. 179
Whatever the explanation for this divisionbetweenpolitical and economic
centers, we can assume that the Nguyen rulers in Quang Tri and Hue kept a very close
eye on their Hoi An breadbasket. The Nguyen were clearly aware of the importance of
' See Do Bang, "Relations and Pattern of Trade between Hoi an and the
Inland," in Ancient Town of Hoi An, p.150; Nguyen Dinh Dau, "The Birth
and the Historic Evolution of Hoi An," in Ancient Town of Hoi An, p.11 7;
Truong Huu Quynh, "The Birth and Development of Pho Hien," in Pho
Hien: The Center of International Commerce in the XVII-XVIII Centu-
ries, p.34; and Tranh Thi Vinh, "Thang Long - Pho Hien Commercial
Relations in the 17th-18th Centuries," in Pho Hien: The Center of Interna-
tional Commerce in the XVII-XVIII Centuries, p. 205. John Whitmore in a
personal communication noted that although the Trinh did separate the
capital city from the commercial center, over the centuries the commercial
center moved closer and closer to the capital.
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Hoi An, and they probably allowed only members of the royal family or their most
trusted associates to govern the town and the surrounding region. Given the Chinese
dominance of trade in Hoi An after the middle of the 17' century and the increased role
the Chinese played in the local government as well as the Nguyen government, we can
surmise that there was a close relationship, perhaps even alliance, between the Nguyen
and the Chinese with respect to Hoi An. An interesting question for future research may
be exploring the degree to which Hoi An was used as a political tool by those challenging
the Nguyen.
PART IV. CONCLUSION: HOI AN TODAY.
We saw previously how, even before the Tayson rebellion broke out in
the early 1770s, trade at Hoi An had declined steeply for primarily internal reasons. The
destruction of Hoi An during the Tayson rebellion marked a clear severance for Hoi An
between its glorious past and its future. With the establishment of the Nguyen dynasty
in 1802, peace returned to Vietnam and Hoi An began to recover from the devastation
of the previous 30 years. However, the town would not regain the stature it held from
1600 to the 1770s.
One reason why Hoi An failed to regain its past glory was the silting up
of the Thu Bon River, a process that began as early as the middle 1700s and quickly
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accelerated in the early 1800s, making it impossible for large ships to navigate the
river.'" The silting up of the Thu Bon resulted in part in the development of Touran or
today's Danang. Danang's harbor had always been much deeper and more protected than
Hoi An's and often was the place where many larger European ships anchored before
proceeding to Hoi An. The two towns were for many years linked by a waterway which
dried up in the mid 1800s; Danang and the peninsula south of it actually formed a large
and narrow island."' It was from Danang via this "inland" waterway that many ships
entered the Hoi An area. Given the fine attributes of the Danang harbor, it is somewhat
surprising that Hoi An did as well as it did.182 In 1835 the Nguyen ruler decreed that all
western ships trading in Vietnam had to stop in Danang, indicating that the authorities
realized the importance of the harbor.' 83 By the mid 19 century, if not before, Danang
18 See Vu Van Phai and Dang Van Bao, "Geomorphological Features of Hoi
An and its Neighborhood," in Ancient Town of Hoi An, pp.62-3; Chen,
Historical Notes on Hoi An, p.30; Wheeler, Cross-Cultural and Trans-
Regional Networks, Chapter Five. Wheeler also suggests that the preva-
lence of deeper-hulled trading vessels in the 1800s exacerbated the silt
problem. Kirsop in 1750 already noted that the river had become shal-
lower, able to accommodate vessels of 80 tons only. See Kirsop, "Some
Account of Cochinchina," p. 241.
181 See Duong Trung Quoc, "Relationship Between Hoi An and Danang," in
Ancient Town of Hoi An, pp.184-9.
182 The French realized the value of Danang as early as the mid 1700s; the
1749 account from Poivre mission suggested that Danang would be the
best spot for a French trading factory. See"Description of Cochinchina," in
Southern Vietnam under the Nguyen: Documents on Economic History, p.
95.
183 See Duong Trung Quoc, "Relationship Between Hoi An and Danang ," p.
188.
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had clearly replaced Hoi An as the center for hinterland and coastal trade in central
Vietnam. 84
Even if the Thu Bon had not silted up, the different circumstances of
Vietnam in the early 1800s would likely have limited Hoi An's ability to recapture its
trading past. By the first part of the nineteenth century, south Vietnam - the area around
the Mekong delta - had become a major economic center, surpassing central Vietnam.
The "southern expansion" had indeed reached as far south as geography permitted by the
first half of the 1800s, and Vietnamese as well as Chinese continued to pour into the
area. Reflecting this shift was the rise of Saigon as the primary trading entrepot in
Vietnam. Saigon had received a boost in 1778 as a number of Chinese, fleeing the
Tayson, settled at Cholon, about five kilometers away. Though Cholon was sacked and
many Chinese killed in 1782 during the Tayson, the city recovered quickly and received
a further boost when Nguyen Anh - the future Gia Long - made it his capital in 1788.
Nguyen Anh promoted trade and development, and many Chinese left central Vietnam
and headed south.18" Shipping figures confirm this rise of Saigon as a major trading
center: it has been estimated that three hundred Chinese junks were calling at Saigon in
the early nineteenth century, five to six times the peak numbers of vessels which visited
184 Wheeler, Cross Cultural Trade and Trans-Regional Networks, p. 214.
18s See Clifton Barton, Credit and Commercial Control: Strategies and
Methods of Chinese Businessmen in South Vietnam, (PHD Dissertation,
Cornell University, 1977), pp. 40; Wheeler, Cross Cultural Trade and
Trans-Regional Networks, pp. 206-210; Chen, Historical Notes on Hoi
An, p. 28.
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Hoi An in the 1740s and 50s.86 By 1820 at the latest, Saigon as an economic center had
clearly surpassed Hoi An.187
Thus, the circumstances ofthe early 1800s were quite different from those
of 1600. Hoi An had risen at the turn of the 1600s primarily as a response to the needs
of the new kingdom to find a means of support in its struggle for survival; facing a hostile
neighbor to the north in the Trinh, Nguyen Cochinchina needed a jumpstart and found
it in international trade, with Hoi An serving as the nexus. The 1835 decree making
Danang the primary destination for western ships was, if anything, indicative that the new
Nguyen dynasty in the early 1800s did not need Hoi An the way Nguyen Hoang needed
it back in 1600. Vietnam of the early 1800s - now unified in its modern-day form from
north to south for the first time in its history- was economically and politically very
different from the Vietnam of 1600.
Despite these factors, Hoi An was rebuilt in the 1800s and seemed to
grow at a steady if slow pace, supporting a fair amount of trade until the river silted up.
186 Anthony Reid, "A New Phase of Commercial Expansion," p.70. Reid cites
a paper presented by Li Tana as the source for this astoundingly high
figure. John Crawfurd, in recounting his mission to Siam and Cochinchina
in 1821-22, notes the number of Chinese vessels visiting Vietnamese ports
as follows (he says these are 'common' annual figures, though they may
have been just for 1820 or 1821): close to 40 per year in north Vietnam,
about 30-35 per year in Saigon, 16 to Hoi An, and 12 to Hue. See John
Crawfurd, Journal of an Embassy to the Courts of Siam and Cochin
China, (Singapore, Oxford University Press, reprinted in 1987 and 1967
from the 1828 first edition), pp.510-13.
187 Wheeler, Cross Cultural Trade and Trans-Regional Networks, p. 209.
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However, Hoi An was much more prominent in local trade than in international trade.
Many Chinese did return to the town, and it was during the middle to late 1800s that a
tremendous amount of Chinese shophouses, assembly halls, village halls, altar houses and
temples, many of which can be visited today, were built. 188 Hoi An also expanded into
several streets which together with the original street along the river form today's
"ancient quarter." Set against the backdrop of its former glory, however, Hoi An seemed
to fade quietly into the past as time wore on.
In 1985, the Vietnamese Ministry of Culture, recognizing the value of
many of the old buildings and quarters in Hoi An, declared the ancient street quarter of
Hoi An an historic district. Since then, preservation efforts have begun, and many of the
700 or so architectural "vestiges" have been classified.189 The government is also heavily
promoting Hoi An as a tourist destination. There were a number of tourists present when
this author visited the town in December 1997, but Hoi An nevertheless managed to
retain its pleasant, sleepy charm.
A stroll through Hoi An today provides a tantalizing glimpse into its
fascinating past. The modern visitor can wander along the quay and look out on the
river, still crowded with hundreds of boats, albeit much smaller than the junks of
188 See Chen, Ancient Town of Hoi An, Chapter Four, for more on these 19
century structures. My own visit to Hoi An in 1997 confirmed that many
of its present day buildings were 19* century structures.
189 See Hoang Dao Kinh, Hoang Minh Ngoc, Vu Huu Minh and Nguyen
Hong Kien, "Some Suggestions on the Preservation and Utilization of
Vestiges in Hoi An," in Ancient Town of Hoi An, pp. 222-29.
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yesteryear. Many of the boats have the Hoi An "eyes" (the yin/yang symbols painted on
boats that resemble eyes and are actually found all over Hoi An today) which seem to
follow the visitor around. It takes only the smallest bit of imagination to visualize the
crowded harbor of three hundred years ago, teeming with Chinese junks, European
trading ships and Southeast Asian prahus. It is also easy to imagine the wide variety of
people - Japanese, Chinese, Chams, northern Vietnamese, other Southeast Asians,
Portuguese, Dutch, English and Jesuits - walking the streets of Hoi An and bartering in
the market. The rich architecture of the town remains a wonderful treasure trove of
classic Chinese shophouses (all narrow but deep), heavily ornamented temples, and
assembly and communal halls with numerous inscriptions, all interspersed among the
narrow streets of the town's ancient quarter. And of course there is the Japanese bridge,
a present-day reminder of the once influential Japanese presence. Few other trading
ports ofpre-modern Southeast Asia - only Malacca and perhaps old town Batavia come
to mind - today evoke the desire to examine the past that Hoi An inspires. Indeed, Hoi
An's story practically jumps out at the visitor, begging to be told.
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